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1 Introduction
When studying the allocation of litigation costs incurred by the parties to a lawsuit, economists
generally assume a binary choice between the “American Rule” on one hand and the “En-
glish Rule” on the other. Under the American Rule, each party is expected to bear its own
litigation costs whether or not it wins the case – a practice that reflects the usual treatment
of costs in U.S. litigation. Under the English Rule, by contrast, a party that loses a lawsuit
is expected to bear not only its own litigation expenses, but also those of the winning party.
This practice, which is based on the traditional treatment of costs in the UK, in effect shifts
the cost of litigation (principally attorneys’ fees) from the victorious party to its opponent
and, thus, is alternatively known as “fee shifting.”1 In this paper, we extend the literature on
litigation cost allocation beyond these two binary choices to include intermediate regimes
that allow the winning litigant to recover some, but not all, of its litigation expenses.
The existing theoretical literature on the distinction between the American and English
Rules suggests that the practice of fee shifting has four primary effects.2 First, existing
models predict that fewer suits will settle in a legal environment where the English Rule
applies. Assuming that the parties have asymmetric information about the likely outcome of
a case, the English Rule will tend to exaggerate their disagreement about the expected value
of their respective recovery or payout by adding litigation costs to the total amount at stake
in the case. Second, with similar reasoning, the literature predicts that the English Rule will
tend to increase the overall rate of litigation. For the same reason that fewer cases will settle
once filed, fewer disputes will settle before a lawsuit is filed. Third, the literature shows
that the English Rule can affect the types of cases that are filed. When the parties share
relatively symmetric information, the English Rule will tend to deter the filing of weak,
i.e., low-probability-of-winning, cases by reducing the plaintiff’s total expected recovery
and, conversely, under the same circumstances, the English Rule will tend to encourage the
1Neither the UK nor the U.S. legal systems actually enforce rules as rigid as those assumed in traditional
economic analyses. In the UK, a successful party is likely to recover a good deal less than its actual costs total.
For example, prevailing parties in UK patent cases generally recover about half to two-thirds of their actual
costs (Forsyth and Watts, 2011). Similarly, in the U.S. various common law rules and statutory provisions
permit fee awards under certain circumstances, especially when a litigant has acted in bad faith (see, for
example, Cohen, 2008).
2For an overview, see Spier (2007).
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filing of strong, i.e., high-probability-of-winning, cases by increasing the plaintiff’s expected
total award.3 In effect, the risk of paying the defendant’s costs acts as potential penalty
for bringing weak claims, while the prospect of having one’s own costs covered by the
defendant serves as a reward for bringing strong claims. Finally, the literature predicts
that the English Rule will lead parties to litigate their cases more intensely. Because the
prospect of fee shifting raises the stakes of litigation, it likewise raises the marginal benefit of
additional spending. At the same time, the potential for a cost-recovery award decreases the
marginal cost of devoting additional resources to litigation by introducing some likelihood
that one’s opponent will eventually reimburse that additional cost.
Despite general consensus in the theoretical literature that the English Rule should have
these four effects, relatively little empirical evidence has been collected in an effort to con-
firm (or refute) their existence in real-world litigation.4 The lack of empirical analysis
is likely explained by the difficulty inherent in making comparisons of litigation behav-
ior across jurisdictions, combined with a general lack of (quasi-)experimental data in the
area of litigation that would allow such analysis. Indeed, much of the available empiri-
cal evidence focuses on litigation in two idiosyncratic U.S. states: Alaska, the only state
that routinely awards attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties, (Di Pietro, et al., 1995; Rennie,
2012) and Florida, which applied the English Rule in medical malpractice cases between
1980 and 1985 (Snyder and Hughes, 1990; Hughes and Snyder, 1995; Helland and Yoon,
2017). Most other studies have been limited to contributing experimental results (Ander-
son and Rowe, 1995; Rowe and Anderson, 1996; Inglis et al., 2005; Massenot et al., 2017),
survey data (Kritzer, 1984; Pfenningstorf 1984; Genn, 1987; Shapard, 1995), or exami-
nations of similar, but distinct, cost-recovery rules such as one-way fee shifting provisions
available in certain types of U.S cases (Schwab and Eisenberg, 1988), offer-of-judgment
statutes enacted in some U.S. jurisdictions (Yoon and Baker, 2006), the shifting of ‘success
fees’ owed pursuant to conditional fee arrangements (Fenn et al., 2017), or the cumulative
effect of multiple heterogeneous fee shifting regimes aggregated across causes of action and
3As Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1998) show, the English Rule can also have the opposite effect when the
parties have asymmetric information.
4For an overview of the relevant empirical literature, see Kritzer (2002).
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jurisdictions (Williams, 2001; Fournier and Zuehlke, 1989).
We advance the literature, both by generalizing existing theoretical models to cover
a more realistic spectrum of fee shifting regimes and by offering empirical evidence on
the impact of an intermediate fee shifting regime on litigation. Specifically, we model and
measure the impact of a reform that caps the amount of litigation expenses that a successful
litigant may recover in a jurisdiction that heretofore followed the English Rule. Such a cap
limits the extent to which fees are shifted from the losing party to the winning party, and
thus establishes what is effectively an “intermediate” fee shifting rule that sits on a spectrum
between the English and American Rules and shares characteristics of each.
We first build a theoretical model in which heterogeneous potential plaintiffs decide
whether to file a case against a privately informed defendant. If the case is filed, the plain-
tiff makes a settlement offer to the defendant which can be accepted or rejected, in which
case a judgment is handed down by the court. Our model extends the seminal litigation
model by Bebchuk (1984) in three respects. First, while Bebchuk deals with the case of
a single plaintiff (or, equivalently, homogeneous plaintiffs), we consider a set of heteroge-
neous potential plaintiffs who must decide whether to file a case in court, and assume that
it is costly to do so. This feature of our model is crucial for the investigation of the effect
that the costs cap (and, more generally, any change in the cost-recovery rule) has on the
number of cases filed. Second, our model focuses on post-filing settlements, which we are
able to observe, while Bebchuk (1984) deals with pre-trial settlements, which are gener-
ally unobservable because they take place on a confidential basis before a lawsuit is filed.
Therefore, unlike Bebchuk (1984) and other models of pre-trial settlement, our model can
be mapped onto observable empirical patterns of settlement. Third, we consider a gen-
eral class of cost-recovery rules, which allows us to study the effect of any one-sided or
two-sided fee-shifting rule and, in particular, a cap on recoverable costs that produces an
intermediate fee shifting rule.
Our theoretical analysis concludes that the impact of a shift away from a pure English
Rule to an intermediate regime (e.g., due to the imposition of a costs cap) on case filings is
ambiguous in general. This results from the existence of two opposite effects: a decrease
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in plaintiffs’ recoverable costs weakens their incentives to file a case while a decrease in
defendants’ recoverable costs strengthens those incentives. We also establish that the effects
of a costs cap on settlement rate, plaintiff win rate, and plaintiff average litigation spending
can be decomposed into a direct effect (i.e., the effect for a given set of plaintiffs) and an
indirect effect resulting from the impact of the costs cap on the set of plaintiffs. While
the direct effect is similar to the effect identified in models with a single or homogeneous
plaintiffs (such as Bebchuk, 1984), the indirect effect has been overlooked in the existing
literature on litigation and settlement.5 Our analysis shows that the indirect effect of a
costs cap on settlement rate, plaintiff win rate, and plaintiff average litigation spending
has the same sign as its direct effect whenever the costs cap generates an increase in case
filings. In that scenario, our model predicts that a costs cap leads to a higher settlement
rate, a lower plaintiff win rate, and lower plaintiff average litigation expenditures. While
this result extends to the scenario in which the costs cap does not affect case filings or
reduces them slightly, the overall impact of the costs cap becomes ambiguous if the costs
cap leads to a substantial decrease in case filings.
Next, we take an empirical look at the impact of a 2010 court reform implemented in
the UK.6 The reform introduced a £50,000 cap on the total amount of costs that a victorious
litigant may recover in an intellectual property (IP) suit decided by the IP Enterprise Court
(IPEC),7 one of just two venues for litigating IP disputes in England and Wales.8 Post-
reform, while litigants in IP suits assigned to the other court – the High Court of England
and Wales (PHC)9 – may continue to pursue full recovery of their litigation expenses without
restriction, parties in cases assigned to the IPEC can hope to recover at most £50,000 (and in
5Note that this indirect effect is not specific to the screening model we consider. It exists in any model in
which a change in the parties’ recoverable costs induces a change in the set of cases filed.
6The UK comprises separate legal systems: England & Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Our data
focus on England & Wales where the overwhelming majority of cases occur.
7Prior to October 2013, the IPEC was known as the Patents County Court (see Online Appendix B). The
change was made to clarify that the court may hear a range of IP cases, not just those relating to patents. For
the sake of simplicity, we refer to the court as the IPEC for the entire period covered by our data, 2007-2013.
8For a more detailed description of the UK IP litigation system see Cremers et al. (2016).
9In addition to the IPEC, UK IP cases are heard by the Chancery Division of the High Court, either in
the general High Court, which hears cases concerning copyright, trademarks (UK/Community) and passing
off, and unregistered designs (UK/Community), or at the specialist Patents Court, which hears cases that
involve patents and registered designs (UK/Community). For simplicity, we refer to the general High Court
and Patents Court as PHC.
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practice generally much less) and thus commonly must bear a portion of their own expenses
despite winning.
Using data hand collected from more than 2,000 physical IP case files, we track and
compare IP litigation initiated in both courts over the period 2007-2013, and in the process,
leverage two helpful characteristics of our data set. First, because the PHC was not directly
impacted by the reforms, we treat IP litigation in that venue as a control group to isolate
the causal effect of the IPEC costs cap from unobservable time-varying factors. Second, we
take advantage of heterogeneity among case types: because the costs cap is more likely
to be binding in patent cases (due to the relative complexity and cost of such cases), our
analysis additionally distinguishes between patent cases and cases involving other types of
IP – i.e., trademarks, copyrights, designs, and database rights.
The results of our empirical analysis suggest that the IPEC’s shift from a pure English
Rule to a rule that caps costs awards led to an increase in the number of patent cases. We
find robust evidence for an increase in patent case filings both within the IPEC, comparing
patent to all other IP cases, and between the IPEC and PHC, comparing patent and all
other IP cases between these two venues. Given the increase in case filings, as predicted
by our theory, we also find evidence for a decrease in the win rate of smaller plaintiffs
and some (albeit weaker) evidence that their settlement rate increased as a result of the
introduction of the costs cap. Finally, our data suggests that litigation expenses by larger
plaintiffs decreased following the change in the cost allocation regime.
Our analysis contributes directly to a number of policy debates concerning the design of
litigation systems and the question of how to allocate litigation costs optimally. Particularly
in the last two decades, the cost of litigation has played a prominent role in legal policy dis-
cussions, including those concerning access to justice and tort or other civil justice reforms.
Among other policy innovations, intermediate cost shifting rules have played an important
role in these debates. In addition to the costs cap adopted by IPEC, similar rules now ap-
ply in a few niche areas of U.S. law, including a cap on fees that legal representatives can
claim after successfully litigating claims for social security disability benefits (Hoynes et al.,
2016). Despite this, no studies to date have attempted to analyze the effect of such caps on
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litigation behavior.
In the context of IP litigation, the topic of litigation costs has played a particularly promi-
nent role in policy debates. In recent years, U.S. policymakers have proposed and debated
multiple legislative reforms that would make fee awards routine in patent suits.10 In ad-
dition, calls for the establishment of a small claims court for IP disputes – one that would
resemble the IPEC in many regards – have drawn the attention of U.S. policymakers mul-
tiple times since 2013.11 Meanwhile, in Europe, policymakers stand on the precipice of
establishing a Unified Patent Court (UPC), the primary function of which will be to signif-
icantly reduce the cost of enforcing patent rights continent-wide (McDonagh, 2016). In
addition, the UPC will alter the way fee shifting rules apply in many patent cases by intro-
ducing costs caps that vary with the value of the case and, at the low end, establish ceilings
on recovery even lower than the one applicable in the IPEC.12
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical
model and its implications for the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data used
in our empirical analysis, Section 4 presents our analysis and results, and Section 5 offers
concluding remarks.
2 Model
The theoretical literature on the comparison between the American Rule and the English
Rule has focused on their effects on filing decisions, litigation spending, and settlement
behavior (see Spier, 2007). Following and extending this literature, we lay out a model that
10For a summary of patent reform legislation proposed in the U.S. Congress since 2013, including the
Innovation Act and SHIELD Act, see Patent Progress (2019). In addition, in a pair of cases decided in 2014,
the Supreme Court of the United States modified the test that U.S. courts apply when deciding whether to
award attorney’s fees in patent suits. Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749
(2014); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). Since these
rulings, fee awards in U.S. patent suits (while still rare) have become more common (Flanz, 2016).
11In 2013, the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives commissioned a report on the topic
of creating a small claims court for copyright disputes. The U.S. Copyright Office, which prepared the report,
endorsed the idea. Corresponding legislation – the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act,
or CASE Act – was introduced in 2017 and again in 2019.
12If established, the UPC will make it possible for patent rights to be enforced across 25 European member
countries with a single suit. Under current law, enforcement must take place separately in each country. In
addition, the UPC’s proposed rules for cost shifting awards include caps on the amounts recoverable (Prepara-
tory Committee for the Unified Patent Court, 2016). Current rules propose a e38,000 cap for cases valued at
or below e250,000 and a e56,000 cap for cases valued up to e500,000.
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analyzes the effects of a costs cap on (i) the number of cases filed by potential plaintiffs,
(ii) the settlement rate of cases after filing, (iii) the win rate of plaintiffs in cases that are
not settled, and (iv) plaintiffs’ litigation expenditures.
2.1 Setup
Consider a unit mass of potential plaintiffs (e.g., IP holders) and assume that each potential
plaintiff is involved in a dispute with a single potential defendant (e.g., an alleged infringer).
We suppose that each potential defendant has private information about his probability p
of losing in court, which can be interpreted as her type.13 The potential plaintiff does not
know the defendant’s type but only that it is uniformly distributed over an interval

p, p¯

.
Let D ∈ (D, D¯] be the value of the damages that are awarded by the court to a potential
plaintiff who files a case and prevails at trial.14 D can be interpreted as the type of the
potential plaintiff and is assumed to be common knowledge.15 We assume that D is uni-
formly distributed over (D, D¯] and, for the sake of simplicity, we suppose that D and p are
independent variables.
Let cp be the cost of filing a case and Cp the additional litigation costs that a plaintiff
has to incur if he neither drops nor settles the case. Also, denote Cd a defendant’s litigation
costs. We consider a general cost allocation rule under which a winning plaintiff recovers
an amount Rp ∈

0, cp + Cp

while a winning defendant recovers an amount Rd ∈ [0, Cd].
The polar case where Rp = Rd = 0 corresponds to the American rule, while the polar case
where Rp = cp + Cp and Rd = Cd corresponds to the English rule. Finally, we assume that
litigation costs are common knowledge and that the potential plaintiffs and defendants are
risk-neutral.
13In IP litigation, which is the focus of our empirical analysis, it is likely that the defendant (i.e., the alleged
infringer) possesses private information regarding the likelihood of infringement.
14The assumption that the plaintiff receives a payment D from the defendant can be interpreted more
broadly as meaning that the benefit derived by a plaintiff who prevails in court is equal to the loss of the
defendant. In Appendix C, we show that our model can be extended to the case of asymmetric stakes (i.e. the
benefit of a plaintiff prevailing in court is different from the defendant’s loss), which is relevant for instance
if the court awards an injunction to the plaintiff.
15In patent cases, the patent holder is likely to be privately informed about the validity of the patent.
However, the majority of cases in our dataset are related to non-patent IP rights the validity of which is not
at stake. Therefore, we believe that a model featuring one-sided asymmetric information with a privately
informed defendant is a reasonable fit for the empirical context we consider.
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Let us consider the following game for each dispute:
• Stage 0: The potential plaintiff’s type D and the potential defendant’s type p are
realized. D is observed by both parties while p is observed only by the defendant.
• Stage 1: The potential plaintiff decides whether to file a case (hence becoming a
plaintiff). If he does not, the game ends. Otherwise, the game proceeds to the next
stage.
• Stage 2: The plaintiff makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer to the defendant.16
• Stage 3: The defendant decides whether to accept the settlement offer. If he does,
the game ends. Otherwise, the plaintiff incurs additional litigation costs Cp while
the defendant incurs litigation costs Cd , and a decision regarding the infringement is
issued by the court.
To ensure that the plaintiff’s litigation threat in case settlement fails is credible17 (as is
implicitly assumed in Stage 3) we assume that18
p ≥ Cp + Cd
cp + Cp + Cd + D
. (1)
2.2 Equilibrium analysis
The subgame corresponding to Stages 2 and 3 is a straightforward extension of the standard
screening game considered by Bebchuk (1984) to a general cost allocation rule
 
Rp, Rd

.
The next lemma characterizes the equilibrium settlement amount and the corresponding
settlement probability when there is a non-zero probability that settlement fails for any cost
16This implies that our litigation game is a screening game. Extending our analysis to a signaling game a la
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) is outside the scope of this paper but would constitute an interesting robustness
test for our theoretical results.
17In doing so we follow Bebchuk (1984) and the vast majority of screening models in the settlement liter-
ature (see Spier, 2007). A notable exception is Nalebuff (1987).
18To see why this condition implies that the plaintiff will never find it optimal to drop the case if settlement
fails, note that his continuation value from not dropping the case is
p
 
D + Rp − Cp
− (1− p)  Cp + Rd .
The latter is positive for any values p ∈ p, p¯, D ∈  D, D¯, Rp ∈ 0, cp + Cp and Rd ∈ [0, Cd] if Condition (1)
is satisfied.
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allocation rule
 
Rp, Rd

and any plaintiff’s type D ∈ (D, D¯]. A sufficient condition for this to
hold is p¯− p ≥ Cp+CdD , which we assume throughout our analysis.
Lemma 1. A plaintiff of type D offers to settle the case for an amount
S∗
 
D, Rp, Rd

= p¯
 
D + Rp + Rd
− Cp − Rd , (2)
and a defendant accepts to pay such an amount if and only if her type p is above
p∗(D, Rp, Rd) = p¯− Cp + CdD + Rp + Rd . (3)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Considering now Stage 1, a potential plaintiff’s expected gain from filing a case is given
by
Π∗(D, Rp, Rd)≡ p¯− p
∗
p¯− p S
∗ +
p∗ − p
p¯− p

ρ∗
 
D− Cp + Rp
− (1−ρ∗)  Cp + Rd− cp,
where ρ∗ = 12 (p∗ + p¯) is the average probability that the plaintiff prevails in court if the
equilibrium settlement offer is turned down by the defendant. A potential plaintiff decides
to file a case if and only if Π∗(D, Rp, Rd) > 0. The following lemma shows that the set of
potential plaintiffs filing a case has a very natural structure.
Lemma 2. There exists a unique threshold D∗
 
Rp, Rd
 ≥ D, decreasing in Rp and increasing
in Rd , such that a potential plaintiff of type D files a case if and only if:
D > D∗
 
Rp, Rd

.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Let us emphasize here a key difference between our setting and models of pre-trial
settlement. In the latter a potential plaintiff files a case after settlement fails whenever the
credibility condition (1) is satisfied. In our setting, condition (1) ensures that the plaintiff
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proceeds to trial if post-filing settlement fails but is not sufficient to ensure that a case is
filed ex ante. The reason is that a potential plaintiff must pay a positive cost c to file a case,
which is sunk by the time he needs to decide whether to proceed to trial (if the settlement
offer is turned down).
2.3 Effects of a costs cap
In this section we study the effects of a (binding) costs cap, i.e. R¯<min(cp+Cp, Cd), on the
equilibrium number of case filings, the equilibrium settlement rate, and plaintiffs’ win rate
(conditional on not having settled). We also examine the impact of a costs cap on plaintiffs’
litigation expenditures in an extended version of the model.
2.3.1 Number of case filings
Let us first investigate the impact of a costs cap, i.e. a switch from
 
Rp, Rd

=
 
cp + Cp, Cd

to
 
Rp, Rd

=
 
R¯, R¯

, on the number of case filings. To sign this effect, we need to sign
the difference between the post-reform plaintiff’s gain from filing a case and its pre-reform
counterpart, Π∗(D, R¯, R¯)−Π∗(D, cp + Cp, Cd), which can be written as
Π∗(D, R¯, R¯)−Π∗(D, cp + Cp, R¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
negative effect of a decrease in Rp
+Π∗(D, cp + Cp, R¯)−Π∗(D, cp + Cp, Cd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive effect of a decrease in Rd
. (4)
The first term captures the effect of a decrease in plaintiffs’ recoverable costs (resulting from
the costs cap) on a plaintiff’s gain from litigation while the second one captures the effect
of a decrease in defendants’ recoverable costs on that gain. The next lemma shows that the
former is negative while the latter is positive.
Lemma 3. A plaintiff ’s expected gain from litigation Π∗(D, Rp, Rd) is increasing in Rp and
decreasing in Rd .
Proof. See Appendix C.
The inevitable conclusion is that a costs cap has a generally ambiguous effect on plain-
tiffs’ gain from litigation, which leads us to the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. The impact of a costs cap on equilibrium case filings is ambiguous in general.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Thus, the (sign of the) impact of a cap on case filings depends on the specific charac-
teristics of the environment in which the cap is implemented. In Appendix C, we consider
two such characteristics and provide sufficient conditions under which the impact of a cap
is positive (resp. negative). First, we use decomposition (4) to show that a cap has a pos-
itive (resp. negative) effect on case filings if the reduction in plaintiffs’ recoverable costs
resulting from the costs cap is sufficiently small (resp. large) relative to the reduction in
defendants’ recoverable costs. Second, we establish that the impact of a costs cap on case
filings is positive if total litigation costs cp+Cp+Cd are sufficiently large relative to damages.
The next sections show that the way a costs cap affects case filings plays a crucial role in
determining the impact of the cap on the settlement rate, plaintiffs’ win rate, and plaintiffs’
average litigation expenditures.
2.3.2 Settlement rate
Let us now turn to the effect of a costs cap on the equilibrium settlement, i.e. rate
θ ∗
 
Rp, Rd
≡∫ D¯D∗(Rp ,Rd) q∗  D, Rp, Rd dD
D¯− D∗  Rp, Rd ,
where q∗
 
D, Rp, Rd

= 1− p∗(D, Rp, Rd) is the (individual) settlement probability of a plain-
tiff of type D. The difference between the post-reform equilibrium settlement rate and its
pre-reform counterpart can be decomposed into a direct effect and an indirect one:
θ ∗
 
R¯, R¯
− θ ∗  cp + Cp, Cd =
∫ D¯
D∗(cp+Cp ,Cd) q
∗  D, R¯, R¯ dD
D¯− D∗  cp + Cp, Cd −
∫ D¯
D∗(cp+Cp ,Cd) q
∗  D, cp + Cp, Cd dD
D¯− D∗  cp + Cp, Cd︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+
∫ D¯
D∗(R¯,R¯) q
∗  D, R¯, R¯ dD
D¯− D∗  R¯, R¯ −
∫ D¯
D∗(cp+Cp ,Cd) q
∗  D, R¯, R¯ dD
D¯− D∗  cp + Cp, Cd︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
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The direct effect captures the impact of the costs cap on the settlement rate holding the set of
plaintiffs fixed, while the indirect effect captures the change in the settlement rate resulting
from a change in the set of plaintiffs. It is straightforward that the equilibrium probability
of settlement for a given plaintiff is decreasing in both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s
recoverable costs.19 This implies that the direct effect of a costs cap on the settlement rate
is always positive. The sign of the indirect effect is determined by the impact of the costs
cap on the critical threshold D∗ or, equivalently, its impact on the number of case filings.
To see why, note first that the equilibrium probability of settlement for a given plaintiff is
decreasing in its type D.20 This in turn implies that, holding the individual probabilities
of settlement fixed, the settlement rate increases (resp. decreases) if the set of potential
plaintiffs filing a case expands (resp. shrinks).21 In other words, the sign of the indirect
effect is the same as the sign of the impact of the costs cap on case filings. If the latter is
positive then the overall impact of the costs cap on the settlement rate is the sum of two
positive effects and is, therefore, positive. If, however, the costs cap has a negative impact
on case filings, then the direct effect and the indirect effect do not have the same sign and,
consequently, the sign of the overall impact depends on their relative magnitudes. Thus,
we get the following theoretical prediction.
Proposition 2. If a costs cap yields an increase in case filings then it leads to an increase in
the equilibrium settlement rate. However, if a costs cap yields a decrease in case filings then it
has a generally ambiguous effect on the settlement rate.
Note that the the costs cap also leads to an increase in the equilibrium settlement rate
if it does not affect case filings or if it leads to a sufficiently small decrease in case filings.
19This is a straightforward generalization of the result in Bebchuk (1984) about the impact of a switch from
the English Rule to the American Rule on the probability of settlement. The intuition behind this is that a
decrease in recoverable costs does not affect the joint surplus from settlement but makes the adverse selection
problem faced by a plaintiff less severe, i.e., he finds it less costly to separate defendant types.
20The intuition behind this is similar to the intuition behind the result that the settlement probability de-
creases with recoverable costs: a decrease in damages does not affect the joint surplus from settlement but
makes the adverse selection problem faced by a plaintiff less severe.
21The formal proof follows directly from rewritting the indirect effect as:
D∗
 
cp + Cp, Cd
− D∗  R¯, R¯
D¯− D∗  R¯, R¯
 ∫ D¯D∗(R¯,R¯) q∗  D, R¯, R¯ dD
D∗
 
cp + Cp, Cd
− D∗  R¯, R¯ −
∫ D¯
D∗(cp+Cp ,Cd) q
∗  D, R¯, R¯ dD
D¯− D∗  cp + Cp, Cd
 .
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In the former case, there is no indirect effect stemming from a change in case filings while
in the latter the indirect effect is negative but is outweighed by the positive direct effect.
2.3.3 Plaintiffs’ win rate
We now examine the impact of the costs cap on plaintiffs’ win rate conditional on not having
settled, i.e.
γ∗
 
Rp, Rd
≡ ∫ D¯D∗(Rp ,Rd)ρ∗  D, Rp, Rd dD
D¯− D∗  Rp, Rd ,
where ρ∗
 
D, Rp, Rd

= 12

p + p∗
 
D, Rp, Rd

is the probability that an individual plaintiff
of type D ∈ D, D¯ wins if her settlement offer is turned down by the defendant.
We have already shown that p∗
 
D, Rp, Rd

is increasing in Rp and Rd . This implies that
ρ∗
 
D, Rp, Rd

is increasing in Rp and Rd . Therefore, the impact of the costs cap on the
probability that a given plaintiff (who would file a case both in the absence of and under
the cap) prevails in court is negative. Considering the impact of the costs cap on plaintiff
win rate, it is again useful to decompose the overall effect into a direct effect and an indirect
one:
γ∗
 
R¯, R¯
− γ∗  cp + Cp, Cd =
∫ D¯
D∗(cp+Cp ,Cd)ρ
∗  D, R¯, R¯ dD
D¯− D∗  cp + Cp, Cd −
∫ D¯
D∗(cp+Cp ,Cd)ρ
∗  D, cp + Cp, Cd dD
D¯− D∗  cp + Cp, Cd︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+
∫ D¯
D∗(R¯,R¯)ρ
∗  D, R¯, R¯ dD
D¯− D∗  R¯, R¯ −
∫ D¯
D∗(cp+Cp ,Cd)ρ
∗  D, R¯, R¯ dD
D¯− D∗  cp + Cp, Cd︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
The direct effect of the costs cap is always negative because ρ∗
 
D, Rp, Rd

is increasing in
Rp and Rd . The sign of the indirect effect, however, depends on the impact of the costs cap
on the number of case filings. An argument similar to the one used to relate the sign of the
indirect effect of the costs cap on the settlement rate to its effect on case filings, allows us
to state that the indirect effect on plaintiffs’ win rate is negative (resp. positive) if the costs
cap leads to an increase (resp. decrease) in case filings. Thus, we get the following result.
Proposition 3. If a costs cap yields an increase in case filings then it leads to a decrease in
14
plaintiffs’ win rate conditional on not settling. However, if the costs cap yields a decrease in
case filings then it has a generally ambiguous effect on plaintiffs’ win rate.
2.3.4 Plaintiffs’ litigation spending
In this section we extend our model to study the effect of a costs cap on plaintiffs’ average
litigation expenditures. More specifically, let us now assume that each plaintiff can make
an investment before he makes a settlement offer in order to increase the damages he gets
in case settlement fails and he wins at trial. Importantly, we suppose that such investment
is observable to the defendant. Furthermore, we assume that plaintiffs are heterogeneous
regarding the amount they need to invest to achieve a certain increase in damages. Specif-
ically, suppose that an investment x by a plaintiff of type β ∈ β , β¯ allows the plaintiff to
obain D (x ,β) where D(.,β) is increasing, D (0,β) = D0 for any β ∈

β , β¯

, and ∂ D∂ x (x ,β)
is increasing in β . The parameter β can be interpreted as an idiosyncratic efficiency param-
eter. Assuming that Π∗(D (x ,β) , Rp, Rd) is concave in x , we get the following preliminary
result.
Lemma 4. The optimal investment level x∗(β , Rp, Rd) of a given plaintiff is increasing in β ,
Rp, and Rd .
Proof. See Appendix C.
An immediate implication of this lemma is that a costs cap leads to a decrease in a given
plaintiff’s investment level. This means that the direct effect of a costs cap on plaintiff’s
average investment in litigation is negative. However, there is again an indirect effect that
depends on whether the costs cap leads to more or less case filings. It can be easily shown
that, in the current setting, there exists β∗
 
Rp, Rd
 ∈ β , β¯, increasing in Rp and decreasing
in Rd , such that a plaintiff files a claim if and only if β > β
∗  Rp, Rd. As in the baseline
model, the costs cap has an ambiguous effect, in general, on the number of case filings.
However, decomposing again the overall effect of the costs cap into a direct one and an
indirect one and using a reasoning similar to the one behind Propositions 2 and 3 leads to
the following result.
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Proposition 4. If a costs cap leads to an increase in case filings then it also leads to a decrease
in plaintiffs’ average investment in litigation. However, if the cap leads to a decrease in case
filings then its impact on plaintiffs’ average investment in litigation is generally ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix C.
3 Data
For our empirical analysis, we rely on data on IP cases litigated in England and Wales. In
England and Wales, all IP lawsuits are adjudicated in one of two courts: the IPEC and the
PHC. This section describes our methods for collecting data from both courts.
3.1 IPEC
We collected information for all cases filed at the IPEC between 2007 and 2013. To do so,
we examined by hand all physical (i.e., paper) case files stored with the court in London.22
For each IPEC case, we identified its filing date, all parties to the case, all claims and
counterclaims raised by the parties, the specific IP right(s) involved (including patent and
trade mark numbers), and the date and manner in which the case was terminated (either by
settlement or due to a procedural or substantive ruling). We additionally noted when cases
were transferred to or from the IPEC. Data collection was completed between September
2013 and July 2014, and all case data is current as of July 2014.
3.2 PHC
We also collected as much data as possible for IP cases brought in the PHC during the same
2007-2013 period, and again we examined physical court records to do so. Our PHC data
collection efforts here were limited by two challenges. First, some 2007 Chancery Division
case files were destroyed in a fire in 2008. Accordingly, it is likely that our data excludes
some small number of patent cases filed in 2007. Second, another group of case files – one
22For more details on the data collection see Online Appendix D.
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that contained files for all non-patent IP cases initiated prior to 2009 – had been moved to
off-site storage and could not be retrieved for examination.
Subject to these two caveats, we examined by hand all available PHC case files (roughly
5,000 per year) to identify the subset of cases concerning IP rights and to collect data on
their parties and claims. For patent cases, our PHC data spans 2007-2013 and includes
the same information that we collected from IPEC case files. For all other types of IP cases
(i.e., cases concerning copyrights, designs, database rights, and trademarks), our PHC data
is limited to the period 2009-2013 and is further limited with respect to some case-level
details.23
3.3 Firm-level data
To obtain additional data on all parties to the IP cases that we identified, we cleaned and
standardized the raw text collected from court records and, where relevant, consolidated
company litigants into business groups so as not to double-count related subsidiaries ap-
pearing in the same case. Using this data, we identified the location of each company’s
(or group’s) headquarters, obtained basic information for each UK company (e.g., SIC code
and incorporation date) from Companies House’s online WebCheck, and obtained detailed
financial information for all companies (e.g., assets, turnover, and employee count) from
Bureau van Dijk’s FAME database. Finally, combining information from Companies House
and FAME, we classified all companies (or groups) by size as either a micro/SME or large
entity.24
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 IPEC reforms and costs cap
Our empirical analysis focuses on an important change in the cost allocation rules applied by
the IPEC. Since October 2010, cases assigned to the IPEC have been subject to a recoverable
23For more details on our data collection methodology and its limitations, see Online Appendix D.
24We follow the standard EU definition, which relies on information on a firm’s number of employees,
turnover, and total assets.
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costs cap, which limits fee awards to £50,000 for trials on substantive liability (plus an
additional cap of £25,000 relating to subsequent hearings concerning damages).25
This costs cap was one of a series of procedural reforms that went into effect on a stag-
gered basis from 2010 to 2013.26 Among those was the introduction of a £500,000 cap
on damages awards. This limitation on damages was applied to cases asserting patent and
design rights in June 2011, and it was subsequently extended to all IP cases four months
later. While in theory a damages cap can affect litigation behavior, all available evidence
suggests that this particular cap has in actual practice not done so. For one, the damages
cap was set so high that it is very rarely binding. The average value that plaintiffs assigned
to their own IPEC cases during the period of our study was less than £75,000 total.27 Even
among patent cases, which tend to have the largest damages awards, the average case value
provided was less than £230,000 – i.e., less than half the maximum possible recovery. In
addition, many plaintiffs report that the primary reason they file IP suits is to seek injunc-
tions, not damages.28 Both facts are further confirmed by extensive qualitative interviews
that we conducted with legal practitioners (i.e., judges, solicitors, barristers, and patent
and trade mark attorneys) and companies that litigated at the IPEC or High Court during
the period of our study (Helmers et al., 2015).
Second, beginning in late 2012, the IPEC introduced a set of “Small Claims Track” (SCT)
procedures for use in especially low value non-patent cases – i.e., cases enforcing copyrights,
trade marks, database rights, or unregistered designs. This change is also very unlikely to
have affected cases employing ordinary IPEC procedures. Our data indicate that the SCT
has only attracted cases that, before, in all likelihood would not have been litigated at all
due to their low claim value. The vast majority of SCT cases filed during the period of our
study allege infringement of a copyright (mostly digital photos) and were brought by an
individual seeking an average of just £3,300 in damages.29
25Separate hearings on damages occur in the courts of England and Wales after the conclusion of the trial
on substantive matters.
26We provide more details on the legal background and reforms in Online Appendices A and B. See also
Fox (2014) and Helmers et al. (2015).
27This average excludes cases filed in the IPEC "Small Claims Track."
28This is particularly true in patent cases where the plaintiff seeks only the revocation of a patent owned
by the defendant.
29For more discussion and analysis of the SCT see Helmers et al. (2018).
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4.2 Empirical approach
For our empirical analysis, we rely on heterogeneity among IP cases and the availability of
the PHC as a control group to isolate the effect of the adoption of a costs cap at the IPEC in
October 2010 – i.e., an intermediate fee shifting rule – on case filings, litigation expenses,
and case outcomes.
First, we rely on heterogeneity among IP cases. Patent cases tend to be more complex
than cases involving other forms of IP and therefore are more expensive to litigate.30 We
have some data on cost awards among decided cases at the IPEC (see Figure G-1 in the
Online Appendix). It is important to keep in mind that these data come from a small share
of cases that were decided by the court and, moreover, that within the set of decided cases
only a small subset proceeds to a cost hearing because parties more often that not settle the
payment of costs once the case is decided. In addition, the cost awards do not reflect the
total costs incurred by each party, only the costs actually shifted by the court. This explains
why we have this information only for 17 patent cases and 84 cases involving other forms of
IP. That said, the data show that parties incur larger expenses in patent cases (average cost
awards are £37,000) than in cases that involve any other type of IP (average cost awards
are £18,000). This means that the costs cap is more likely to be binding for patent cases;
indeed, we see in Figure G-1 that costs were capped in two patent cases post-reform. We
therefore distinguish in our empirical analysis between patent cases and other non-patent
IP cases.
Second, we rely on the PHC as a control group. No changes were made to the PHC’s cost
allocation rule during the same time period. Therefore we compare case filings, litigation
expenses, and case outcomes at the IPEC and the PHC before and after the reforms. Using
the PHC as a control group allows us to control for any broader trends that could have
affected litigation behavior at the IPEC even in the absence of the introduction of the costs
cap. There are, however, potential concerns with this approach. Litigation at the PHC could
have been affected by the reforms (i) directly or (ii) through forum shopping (i.e., plaintiffs’
30A recent survey of U.S. IP lawyers reports that the median total cost of litigating a low value patent case
exceeds the cost of litigating a copyright case of the same value by 27 percent and the cost of litigating a
similarly valued trademark case by 154 percent (AIPLA, 2019: I-141, I-192, I-208).
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choice to file suit in the IPEC or the PHC), either of which would invalidate the use of the
PHC as a control group.
Regarding (i), in principle, IP cases can be heard and determined by either the IPEC or
PHC (Fox, 2014: 15-16). In practice, however, there has been a clear separation between
the different venues regarding the types of cases they hear. The PHC hears more complex
cases which often involve large companies litigating factually and legally complex issues.
Crucially, this has remained unaffected by the reforms. Indeed, the qualitative data that
we collected from the judges and lawyers involved in IP litigation at both the PHC and
IPEC demonstrate that the PHC was largely unaffected by the IPEC reforms (Helmers et al.,
2015). This in turn raises the concern that litigation at the PHC may not be an appropriate
control group if litigation of complex issues between large companies follows a different
trend and is possibly subject to different unobservable shocks. To address this issue, we in-
clude a large set of case- and litigant controls to account for observable differences between
the IPEC and PHC (for a summary see Online Appendix F).
With respect to (ii), forum shopping could be a concern because parties cannot contract
out of the IPEC fee regime while staying within the IPEC. While plaintiffs generally choose
the venue they deem appropriate, defendants can affect venue choice by applying for a
transfer to another venue. That is, a case that is initiated at the IPEC may be transferred to
the PHC and vice versa. In addition, both courts have the power to transfer cases to the other
venue without consent from either litigating party while imposing the costs of the transfer
on the litigating parties (Fox, 2014: 173-174).31 The case law on transfers shows that the
relevant factors to be considered by judges include the size and financial resources of either
of the litigating parties, factual and legal complexity, the expected length of trial, the value
of the claim and of any non-pecuniary relief sought, and whether a case raises important
issues of law that are in the public interest.32 The case law also shows that judges take into
account any potential abuse of the IPEC or PHC procedures by either party.33 Hence, the
31Note that IP claims (except for patents and registered designs) can also be filed with a select number of
county courts. These courts usually transfer these cases to the IPEC.
32See Fox (2014:48-57) for a detailed review of the different factors and the corresponding extensive case
law.
33For a detailed analysis of the factors and safeguards taken into account, see the judgments in Comic
Enterprises Limited v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation [2012] EWPCC 13 and 77M Ltd v Ordnance
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combination of a clear separation between the IPEC and PHC and transfers ordered by the
court if the venue chosen by the parties is deemed inappropriate act as strong safeguards
against forum shopping.
When we look at actual case transfers between the two venues before and after the
reforms as shown in Figure G-2 in the Online Appendix, we see that the share of cases
transferred from the IPEC to the PHC is extremely low and does not change substantially
following the reforms. Similarly, the share of cases transferred from the PHC to the IPEC
does not change in any significant way following the reforms. Although data on transfers
does not rule out the possibility that venue choice was affected by the introduction of the
costs cap, the combination of quantitative evidence and clear legal guidelines discussed in
this section mitigate concern that litigation at the PHC could have been affected by the costs
cap directly or as a result of forum shopping.
4.3 Case counts
We start by analyzing whether the costs cap has changed the number of case filings at the
IPEC. Table 1 shows the total case counts by IP right for the IPEC and the PHC during the
period 2007-2013.34
At the IPEC, the largest subset of cases concerns trademark claims (331 cases) followed
by copyright (246), design (145), and patent (89) claims. Across all types of IP cases, there
is a notable jump in case filings between 2010 and 2011, which coincides with the introduc-
tion of the costs cap in October 2010. It is tempting to conclude from these figures that case
numbers for all IP rights have substantially increased at the IPEC as a result of the costs cap.
However, the corresponding figures for the PHC caution against hasty conclusions. At the
Survey Ltd [2017] EWCH 1501 (IPEC).
34We exclude SCT cases throughout our analysis as they differ substantially in observable and presumably
unobservable characteristics from the main IPEC multi-track cases. For the same reason we also exclude all
copyright cases filed by the music licensing company PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited) at both the
IPEC and PHC (see Table H-1 in the Online Appendix for case counts including cases brought by PPL). These
cases account for the large majority of copyright cases at the PHC. Note also that as explained in Section 3,
for the PHC we only have data for the entire 2007-2013 period for patent cases. For all other IP rights, our
PHC data are limited to 2009-2013. Note also that in Table 1, we drop all cases at the IPEC and PHC that
were dropped by the plaintiff or for which only the claim form but no response by the defendant was filed –
which are also the data used in our analysis of case outcomes in Section 4.4. For counts of all cases see Table
H-2 in the Online Appendix.
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PHC, we see an increase in IP case counts between 2010 and 2011, too, especially patent
case counts. Patent case counts increased between 2010 and 2011 by 97%. While total case
counts for other IP rights increased only moderately (or in some instances dropped), total
IPEC case counts increased by nearly 50% and total PHC case counts by 11% between 2010
and 2011. This suggests on the one hand that the costs cap may have led to a large increase
in case filings at the IPEC. But, on the other hand, it suggests that additional factors may
have affected case filings (especially patent case filings) during the same time period.
Table 1: IPEC an PHC case counts, 2007-2013
Year Patent Trademark Design Copyright Database Total
IPEC PHC IPEC PHC IPEC PHC IPEC PHC IPEC PHC IPEC PHC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2007 5 29 3 3 8 0 19 29
2008 4 64 14 3 29 0 50 64
2009 8 43 61 63 15 14 28 54 2 4 114 178
2010 8 43 44 106 17 42 33 66 2 16 104 273
2011 25 84 50 103 26 21 48 74 3 21 152 303
2012 22 68 75 95 37 13 41 48 1 7 176 231
2013 17 47 84 58 44 19 59 55 4 6 208 185
Total 89 378 331 425 145 109 246 297 12 54 823 1,263
Notes: For PHC no data available for trademarks, design, copyright, and database rights prior to 2009; trademark case count includes
passing-off claims; design cases includes registered and unregistered design rights. Case counts exclude cases brought by performance
rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). Only cases counted for which filing date available.
Figure 1 investigates this issue further. It plots the log number of cases related to (a)
patents and (b) all other types of IP by filing date of the claim (in quarterly intervals). Since
we only possess data on patent cases at the PHC before 2009, the right-hand-side plot only
shows PHC case counts from 2009 onward. The vertical line represents the introduction of
the costs cap in October 2010. When we look at patent cases, we see a clear jump in filings
at the IPEC during the quarter following the introduction of the costs cap. This finding
is in-line with the evidence we gathered from qualitative interviews and surveys where
respondents indicated that they regarded the costs cap as the key reform that has led to an
increase in case filings. That said, Figure 1 also shows an increase in case filings at the PHC
during the second quarter of 2011. From looking at individual cases, we know that the
increase in patent cases at the PHC during that time window was at least partly driven by
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an increase in patent litigation between companies in the information and communication
technologies industry (for example Nokia filed four cases in the first half of 2011 compared
to just one case in the first half of 2010). This type of patent case would not be suitable
for litigation at the IPEC, which means the increase in case filings at the IPEC cannot be
explained by an increase in this type of case.35 We also note that on average, case filings at
the PHC and IPEC move in parallel before the costs cap suggesting similar pre-reform trends.
The right-hand-side plot also shows a steep increase in case filings at the IPEC; however,
that increase starts long before the introduction of the costs cap and there does not appear
to be be any additional bump following the introduction of the intermediate fee shifting
rule.36 The PHC data for all other IP cases is more difficult to interpret pre-reform due to
the relatively short time window available. However, post-reform we observe a decline in
court cases while we see a sustained increase at the IPEC.
Figure 1: Comparison IPEC-PHC: patent cases and all other IP
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Notes: Copyright case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organization PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited).
Figure 2, shows the βt coefficients of the following regression caset = β0 + β1I PEC +
βt[I PEC × Dt] + "t where caset denotes the log total number of cases by quarter t, I PEC
is a dummy (0/1) variable that is equal to one for all cases heard at the IPEC, and Dt are
35If the factors that have led to the large increase in patent case filings at the PHC did not affect the IPEC
to the same extent, we would underestimate the increase in case filings at the IPEC due to the introduction of
the costs cap when we use the PHC as a control group.
36Note that the spike in case filings at the IPEC at the end of 2009 is due to Nike’s and Nintendo’s idiosyn-
cratic litigation behavior, filing 26 trade mark and 9 trade mark and copyright claims in December 2009,
respectively.
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quarter dummies. If we focus on patent cases shown in the left-hand-side plot, we see that
before the introduction of the costs cap, the IPEC-specific time trend hovers around zero,
which supports the common trends assumption required for the PHC to be a valid control
group in our difference-in-differences approach. Following the introduction of the costs
cap, the coefficients turn immediately positive and are statistically significantly different
from zero. The right-hand-plot in contrast shows the estimates for all other IP cases. We
see that the trend remains relatively flat throughout the entire period observed; there is no
clear increase in case filings following the introduction of the costs cap.
Figure 2: Estimated effect of costs cap: patent cases and all other IP
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Notes: The figure shows the βt coefficients of the following regression caset = β0 +β1 I PEC +βt [I PEC × Dt ]+ "t where caset denotes
the log total number of cases by quarter t, I PEC is a dummy (0/1) variable that is equal to one for all cases heard at the IPEC, and Dt
are quarter dummies. The specification for (b) includes IP type dummy variables. 95% confidence intervals reported.
As discussed in Section 4.2 above, we start off by analyzing changes in case counts
within the IPEC where we compare patent cases with cases associated with all other types
of IP (see Figure G-3 in the Online Appendix). We estimate the effect of the introduction
of the costs cap on case filings using OLS where we regress the log of the total number
of cases by quarter (caset) on a dummy (0/1) variable that is equal to one for all patent
cases heard at the IPEC (Pat), and a dummy variable that indicates when the costs cap was
introduced at the IPEC (Post re f ormt) which is equal to one from October 2010 onward
and their interaction (Pat × Post re f ormt):
caset = β0 + β1Pat + β2Post re f ormt + β3Pat × Post re f ormt +δt + "t (5)
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The coefficient on the interaction term β3 captures the differential effect of the costs cap
on patent case filings relative to all other types of IP at the IPEC. In our regressions, we also
distinguish between cases where the plaintiff is a SME or a large company. The results in
Table 2 show that the coefficients on the interaction term Pat × Post re f orm are positive,
large, and statistically significant in columns (1) and (3). This suggests that the number of
patent cases that were brought before the IPEC increased significantly relative to the PHC
following the reforms. A comparison of the results in columns (2) and (3) suggests that
this effect is driven by large plaintiffs.37
Table 2: IPEC: total number of patent vs all other IP court cases by quarter, 2007-2013
Patents vs All other IP
All P SME P Large
(1) (2) (3)
Patent 18.014*** 12.170** 24.868***
(5.415) (6.018) (6.506)
Postreform -0.523 -0.118 -0.785
(0.332) (0.381) (0.484)
Patent×Postreform 1.151** 0.480 1.340**
(0.438) (0.460) (0.572)
Time trend (quarterly) YES YES YES
Time trend × Patent YES YES YES
R2 0.877 0.786 0.757
Number obs. 56 56 56
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable log(number of cases by quarter +1). P SME: plaintiff is SME; P Large: plaintiff is large firm.
All regressions include a constant. Time period 2007-2013; trademark case count includes passing-off claims; design cases includes
registered and unregistered design rights. Case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organisation PPL (Phonographic
Performance Limited). Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Next, we use the PHC cases as a control group. We first run separate regressions com-
paring case counts at the IPEC and PHC before and after the introduction of the costs cap
for both the set of patent cases and the set of all non-patent IP cases. That is, we use a spec-
ification similar to Equation (5) except that we use a dummy (0/1) variable that is equal to
37As shown in Table H-3 in the Online Appendix, our results are qualitatively unchanged when we rely on
monthly instead of quarterly data.
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one for all cases heard at the IPEC (I PEC) instead of the patent case dummy variable Pat:
caset = β0 + β1I PEC + β2Post re f ormt + β3I PEC × Post re f ormt +δt + "t (6)
Table 3 shows in columns (1)-(3) results for the set of patent cases whereas columns
(4)-(6) show our results for all other types of IP cases (in the regressions shown in columns
(4)-(6) we also include dummy variables for the different types of IP rights). In columns
(1) and (2), the coefficients on the interaction term I PEC × Post re f orm are positive,
large, and statistically significant. This suggests that the number of patent cases that were
brought before the IPEC increased significantly following the reforms relative to the PHC;
for example the coefficient in column (1) implies an increase of around 65% relative to the
PHC. The results in columns (2) and (3) suggest that this effect is driven by SME plaintiffs.
This contrasts with our findings from Table 2 and suggests that within the set of IPEC cases
the increase in patent cases was driven by large plaintiffs, while the increase was driven by
SME plaintiffs when compared to the PHC. The results for all other types of IP cases also
show an increase in case filings for SME plaintiffs, but there is no statistically significant
effect for all types of plaintiffs nor for the subset of large plaintiffs.38
In order to evaluate the validity of our results, Figure 3 shows the results from a simple
counterfactual exercise. We estimate Equation (5) using the observed data on patent cases
and compute the corresponding predicted values. Next, we set the Post re f orm dummy
variable equal to zero to obtain a counterfactual set of predicted values. Figure 3 shows
that the observed data displays a clear jump in case filings following the introduction of
the costs cap, whereas our results when we set Post re f orm = 0 suggest that case counts
would have largely remained unchanged in the absence of the costs cap.
Next we implement a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach by combining the
38Table H-6 in the Online Appendix shows the same results generated using monthly instead of quarterly
data. Again, the results are largely unchanged, though we also find a marginally statistically significant
increase in case filings for all plaintiff types in all non-patent IP cases.
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Table 3: IPEC and PHC: total number court cases by quarter, 2007-2013
Patents All other IP
All P SME P Large All P SME P Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IPEC -1.554*** -0.382** -1.921*** -0.467* -0.357 -0.756*
(0.133) (0.160) (0.144) (0.246) (0.326) (0.378)
Postreform 0.441 0.883** 0.105 1.069** 0.406 2.168**
(0.349) (0.395) (0.217) (0.470) (0.393) (0.746)
IPEC×Postreform 0.502*** 0.718*** 0.126 0.484 0.839** 0.364
(0.172) (0.223) (0.244) (0.292) (0.367) (0.427)
IP type FE YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.925 0.731 0.914 0.931 0.896 0.926
Number obs. 56 56 56 48 48 48
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable log(number of cases by quarter +1). P SME: plaintiff is SME; P Large: plaintiff is large firm.
All regressions include a constant. Time period for all IP is 2009-2013 because no data are available for trade marks, design, copyright
and database rights at the PHC prior to 2009; data for patent cases for 2007-2013; trademark case count includes passing-off claims;
design cases includes registered and unregistered design rights. Case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organisation
PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). IP type FE: dummy variable for each type of IP right (patent, trademark, copyright, registered
design, database). Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Figure 3: Comparison IPEC-PHC: patent cases with/out costs cap
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Notes: Solid lines (“costs cap”) show predicted values obtained from the following specification caset = β0+β1 I PEC+β2Post re f ormt+
β3 I PEC × Post re f ormt +δt + "t , dashed lines (“no costs cap”) obtained from setting Post re f orm = 0.
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two approaches of Equations (5) and (6):
caset = β0 + β1I PEC + β2Post re f ormt + β3Pat+
+ β4I PEC × Post re f ormt + β5I PEC × Pat + β6Pat × Post re f ormt+
+ β7I PEC × Pat × Post re f ormt +δt + "t
(7)
The coefficient on the triple interaction term β7 captures the differential effect of the
costs cap on patent case filings at the IPEC following the introduction of the intermediate
fee shifting rule. The results are shown in Table 4.39 We see that the triple interaction
term is again positive for all three samples in columns (1)-(3). The triple interaction term
in column (1) indicates that patent cases at the IPEC increased significantly relative to all
other IP cases and relative to cases at the PHC following the introduction of the costs cap.
The coefficient β7 in column (2) for the set of SME plaintiffs is also positive but marginally
not statistically significant. Instead, similar to the results shown in Table 2, case filings by
large plaintiffs increased significantly following the change in fee shifting rules.
Finally, as a robustness test, we also use a parametric regression discontinuity approach
relying on the potential discontinuity induced by the introduction of the costs cap. Since
the introduction of the costs cap occurred on a specific date and only applied to cases
filed after this date (it was not retroactively applied to cases filed earlier that were still
pending in October 2010), we can look for any discontinuous changes around the cut-off
date. Figure G-4 in the Online Appendix shows again case filings by quarter for patent
cases and cases associated with all other types of IP at the IPEC and the PHC. Despite the
relatively sparse data, the figure suggests that there was a discrete jump in case filings only
among patent cases at the IPEC around the introduction of the costs cap. There is little
evidence for any discontinuity among all other IP cases at the IPEC or the PHC. Table H-
6 in the Online Appendix contains the corresponding regression results. As suggested by
Gelman and Imbens (2019), we include a quadratic polynomial of our forcing variable in
all specifications. Yet again, we see a large positive coefficient on the post-cap dummy for
39 Results using monthly data are shown in Table H-5 in the Online Appendix
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Table 4: IPEC and PHC: total number of patent vs all other IP court cases by quarter, 2007-
2013
IPEC vs PHC: Patents vs All other IP
All P SME P Large
(1) (2) (3)
IPEC 0.442 0.340 -0.263
(0.456) (0.315) (0.434)
Patent 0.481 -0.200 0.368
(0.501) (0.330) (0.477)
Postreform 3.255*** 1.861*** 3.361***
(0.575) (0.384) (0.618)
IPEC×Postreform -1.472*** -0.041 -1.513
(0.471) (0.350) (0.460)
IPEC×Patent -1.997*** -0.723* -1.657***
(0.552) (0.404) (0.536)
Patent×Postreform -2.210*** -1.220*** -2.107***
(0.512) (0.371) (0.496)
IPEC×Patent×Postreform 1.974*** 0.760 1.639***
(0.576) (0.459) (0.588)
Quarter FE YES YES YES
R2 0.751 0.697 0.777
Number obs. 112 112 112
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable log(number of cases by quarter +1). P SME: plaintiff is SME; P Large: plaintiff is large firm.
All regressions include a constant. Time period for all IP is 2009-2013 because no data are available for trademarks, design, copyright
and database rights at the PHC prior to 2009; data for patent cases for 2007-2013; trademark case count includes passing-off claims;
design cases includes registered and unregistered design rights. Case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organisation
PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
29
patent cases at the IPEC, but not for other non-patent IP cases. The table also conducts a
placebo test by moving the date of the introduction of the costs cap by one year in both
directions, i.e., instead of October 2010, we set it to October 2009 and October 2011. In
neither scenario do we find evidence for a statistically significant increase in case filings
among patent cases, and in both, results are largely unchanged for all other types of IP
cases.
Overall, these results provide robust evidence that case counts increased as a result of
the costs cap and that the increase was driven by both SME and large plaintiffs, depending
on the comparison group used in the analysis.
4.4 Litigation expenses and outcomes
Next, we analyze whether the costs cap affected litigation spending and case-level out-
comes.
In this part of our analysis, we utilize a large number of case- and litigant-level char-
acteristics. While this allows us to account for observable heterogeneity among cases,40 it
also restricts our analysis to PHC cases involving patent rights (since we were unable to col-
lect detailed information on case outcomes for all other types of PHC cases, see Section 3).
We further limit the analysis to IPEC and PHC cases in which the defendant appeared and
affirmatively defended the case to a settlement or court decision. Accordingly, we remove
all cases that were dropped by the plaintiff,41 as well as all that were still pending in the
first instance at the time of our data collection. Unfortunately, imposing these restrictions
comes at a significant cost: it reduces the number of patent cases at the IPEC to just 15
cases before the introduction of the costs cap and just 52 cases afterwards (9 and 34 of
which, respectively, were filed by SMEs). We therefore cannot rely on case heterogeneity
and instead must focus exclusively on differences between litigation at the IPEC and the
PHC (and, as a result, we are less likely to find an effect).
Table 5 shows the mean of all included variables before and after the introduction of
40For details on these case- and litigant-level characteristics see appendix E.
41In addition to cases that were clearly dropped – e.g., because the defendant entered into bankruptcy – we
also assume that a case was dropped if the case file contained the claim form but lacked any response from
the defendant.
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the costs cap. We see a number of statistically significant changes in observable case- and
litigant characteristics at the IPEC, but much less so at the PHC. Table H-7 in the Online
Appendix compares average litigant- and case-level characteristics between the IPEC and
the PHC, and distinguishes as well between the set of cases brought by SME and large plain-
tiffs. The table underscores the importance of controlling for differences in the observable
characteristics between the IPEC and PHC as cases at the PHC differ significantly in many
ways from cases heard at the IPEC. IPEC cases are more likely to have been transferred to
the IPEC (from local courts and the PHC), infringement claims are brought more often (and
invalidity claims less often) at the IPEC, and litigants are more often UK companies. These
differences are to be expected given the different mandates of the two courts.
We first analyze changes in litigation expenses by plaintiffs and defendants. We do
not observe actual litigation expenses by the parties. As discussed in Section 4.2 above,
information on costs awards (Figure G-1) is only available for a small, selected subset of
cases, and even then, only actual cost awards are observed, not total costs incurred by
the parties. Thus, following survey data, which reports a strong correlation between law
firm size and billing rates,42 we use law firm size as a proxy measure for litigation expenses.
Specifically, we classify all firms representing parties in our case data into six size categories:
(1) 1-5 attorneys, (2) 6-10 attorneys, (3) 11-50 attorneys, (4) 51-200 attorneys, (5) 201-
500 attorneys, and (6) above 500 attorneys.43 Figure G-5 in the Online Appendix shows the
distribution of (plaintiff and defendant) legal counsel size before and after the introduction
of the costs cap for the IPEC and PHC. The graph shows that litigants at the PHC tend to
employ significantly larger law firms than litigants at the IPEC, which is explained by the
fact that the PHC data only cover more complex patent cases where stakes are significantly
higher than for the average IPEC case. As a result, the distribution across size categories is
far less skewed at the IPEC. The graphs suggests that some changes in the size distribution
occurred following the introduction of the costs cap, but it is difficult to gauge the net effect
42AIPLA (2019: I-29, I-42), for example, reports that lawyers who practice IP law at U.S. law firms employ-
ing more than 150 lawyers charge a median hourly fee that is twice as large as the median fee charged by
lawyers at firms employing 5 or fewer attorneys.
43Since the data is at the case-level, when there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants we pick the largest size
category of the legal counsel associated with plaintiffs or defendants. However, our results are not sensitive
to this decision.
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Table 5: IPEC and PHC: case and litigant characteristics before and after introduction of
costs cap, 2007-2013
IPEC PHC
Mean Diff. Mean Diff.
Before After Before After
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Case characteristics
Infringement claim 0.956 0.918 -0.037* 0.512 0.519 0.006
Invalidity claim 0.030 0.063 0.032* 0.427 0.404 -0.023
Infringement counterclaim 0.013 0.018 0.005 0.144 0.181 0.037
Invalidity counterclaim 0.087 0.191 0.104*** 0.367 0.311 -0.056
Case value 24,836 101,447 76,610*** 174,166 845,185 671,018
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff individual 0.152 0.169 0.016 0.048 0.047 -0.0007
Plaintiff SME 0.401 0.477 0.075* 0.198 0.132 -0.066*
Plaintiff Large 0.462 0.389 -0.073* 0.777 0.834 0.057
Plaintiff UK 0.672 0.706 0.033 0.493 0.478 -0.015
Plaintiff Europe 0.061 0.069 0.008 0.307 0.341 0.034
Plaintiff World 0.139 0.122 -0.017 0.307 0.327 0.019
Defendant individual 0.598 0.467 -0.130*** 0.072 0.066 -0.005
Defendant SME 0.519 0.571 0.051 0.289 0.213 -0.075*
Defendant Large 0.100 0.232 0.132*** 0.680 0.734 0.053
Defendant UK 0.606 0.761 0.154*** 0.548 0.540 -0.008
Defendant Europe 0.013 0.040 0.027** 0.325 0.303 -0.021
Defendant World 0.008 0.034 0.025** 0.246 0.303 0.056
NPE 0.013 0.010 -0.003 0.138 0.113 -0.024
Number of obs. 229 490 166 211
Notes: Notes: For PHC data contain only patent cases; trademark case count includes passing-off claims; design cases includes registered
and unregistered design rights. Cases brought by performance rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited) excluded.
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from the graph.
Table 6 shows regression results where the dependant variable is the law firm size vari-
able for the plaintiff in columns (1)-(3) and the defendant in columns (4)-(6). If we focus
on the I PEC interaction term, we find little evidence for a significant change in litigation
expenses. Yet, we find a statistically significant effect for large plaintiffs suggesting that
large plaintiffs reduce their litigation expenses, i.e., employ smaller law firms following
the reforms. These results are in line with the theoretical prediction in Proposition 4 and
the empirical findings by Fenn et al. (2017) on the impact of a reform that affected cost
allocation in the litigation of tort claims in the UK. The reform allowed the winning party
to shift legal success fees associated with conditional fee arrangements to the losing party;
this shift away from intermediate towards full fee shifting increased the plaintiff’s litigation
costs. However, in contrast to Snyder and Hughes (1990) and Hughes and Snyder (1995),
we do not find any significant effects on defense expenditures.
Next, we investigate potential changes to the settlement and plaintiff win rates fol-
lowing the introduction of the costs cap. The theoretical literature suggests that there is
selection into settlement (Priest and Klein, 1984; Bebchuck, 1984; Reinganum and Wilde,
1986; Spier, 2007). However, recent empirical evidence suggests that selection may not
necessarily occur (Helland et al., 2018). We have detailed information on the content of
settlement agreements for a subset of all settled cases that allows us to gauge the importance
of selection into settlement in our data to inform our empirical approach of analyzing the
plaintiff win rate. We obtained this information directly from the court records. Whenever
the outcome of the settlement was clear, i.e., we were able to unambiguously tell whether
the plaintiff or defendant prevailed in the settlement agreement, we coded the outcome
of the settlement agreement as a win or loss for the plaintiff.44 Figure G-6 in the Online
44To provide specific examples of the information available that allowed us to code settlement outcomes: (a)
plaintiff win – in a trademark case where the plaintiff alleged infringement the settlement was summarized
by “The defendant shall not infringe the claimant’s trademark; the defendant shall deliver up all offending
goods within 14 days; the defendant shall provide names and addresses of all persons from whom they
have received products that would infringe the claimant’s trademark; the defendant agreed to pay £2,287 in
damages calculated as account of net profits and the defendant pays £4,475 in costs.” (b) plaintiff loss – in
a patent case where the plaintiff alleged infringement the settlement was summarized by “Agreed upon by
parties to revoke the patent; claimant therefore discontinued claim for infringement and claimant agreed to
pay court costs in the sum of £6,215.”
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Table 6: IPEC and PHC: litigation expenses measured as size of legal counsel employed (by
quarter, 2009-2013)
Plaintiff legal counsel Defendant legal counsel
All P SME P Large All P SME P Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Costs cap
IPEC -0.390 0.146 0.688* -0.750** -0.276 -1.355***
(0.290) (0.488) (0.409) (0.323) (0.621) (0.455)
Postreform 0.828 0.424 0.147 -0.508 0.507 -1.006**
(0.714) (0.962) (1.083) (0.696) (1.193) (0.392)
IPEC×Postreform -0.144 -0.726 -0.924** 0.287 -0.341 0.362
(0.264) (0.525) (0.386) (0.270) (0.680) (0.409)
Case characteristics
Case transferred -0.031 -0.233 0.171 0.095 -0.157 0.073
(0.198) (0.307) (0.314) (0.204) (0.316) (0.384)
ln case value 0.151** 0.165** 0.400*** 0.004 -0.042 0.160
(0.061) (0.064) (0.127) (0.058) (0.073) (0.129)
Infringement claim 0.392 -0.094 0.261 -0.064 -0.297 -0.398
(0.309) (0.501) (0.385) (0.262) (0.563) (0.390)
Invalidity claim 0.548* 0.250 0.313 -0.138 -0.518 -0.537
(0.315) (0.574) (0.379) (0.263) (0.569) (0.388)
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff individual -0.282 0.151 0.036 -0.325 -0.601** 0.251
(0.211) (0.510) (0.795) (0.212) (0.303) (0.517)
Defendant individual -0.321** 0.250 -0.166 -0.370** -0.255 -0.427
(0.160) (0.574) (0.245) (0.161) (0.246) (0.270)
Plaintiff Europe 0.441** -0.036 0.055 -0.135 1.186 -0.352*
(0.175) (0.586) (0.224) (0.161) (0.808) (0.182)
Plaintiff World 0.132 0.264 -0.130 -0.076 -0.428 -0.231
(0.173) (0.675) (0.203) (0.152) (0.660) (0.166)
Defendant Europe 0.480** 0.391 0.437* 0.371* 0.576 -0.011
(0.203) (0.435) (0.246) (0.191) (0.538) (0.214)
Defendant World 0.073 -0.373 0.013 0.343* 0.576 -0.036
(0.202) (0.471) (0.246) (0.175) (0.538) (0.201)
NPE 0.350 -0.091 0.258 -0.446* 1.538*** -0.633***
(0.221) (0.739) (0.233) (0.233) (0.558) (0.203)
IP type FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.329 0.310 0.361 0.264 0.360 0.326
Number obs. 563 207 320 571 201 324
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable is the size category of the legal counsel of the plaintiff or defendant. There are the following
size categories: (1) 1-5 attorneys, (2) 6-10 attorneys, (3) 11-50 attorneys, (4) 51-200 attorneys, (5) 201-500 attorneys, and (6) above
500 attorneys. P SME: plaintiff is SME; P Large: plaintiff is large firm. All regressions include a constant. Time period is 2007-2013; PHC
data contain only patent cases; IPEC trademark cases include passing-off claims; IPEC design cases include registered and unregistered
design rights. Sample excludes cases brought by performance rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). IP type FE:
dummy variable for each type of IP right (patent, trademark, copyright, registered design, database). Regressions include a dummy
variable equal to one if the case value is missing and a dummy variable equal to one if no patent information is available for a patent
case. Time FE by quarter. Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Appendix shows a comparison between the share of cases in which the plaintiff prevailed
in a settlement agreement and in which the plaintiff prevailed in the court decision. The
graph provides strong evidence of selection into settlement, plaintiffs are much more likely
to prevail in settled than decided cases.45 This means that in order to estimate the effect
of the costs cap on the plaintiff win rate, we take into account selection into settlement by
estimating a Heckman (1979) two-step selection model where we estimate in a first step
the likelihood of settlement and then include the inverse Mills ratio in the second step to
estimate the likelihood that a plaintiff wins in a case decided by the court. There is no
obvious exclusion restriction that we can impose in the estimation. However, we include
a dummy variable in the settlement equation that is equal to one if the defendant raised
a counterclaim because raising a counterclaim is likely to be an important determinant of
selection into settlement.46
Table 7 shows the OLS estimates for both the settlement decision and the likelihood that
the plaintiff wins the case. In columns (1)-(2) of Table 7, we use data on all IP cases at
the IPEC and patent cases at the PHC. We see that there is no effect of the costs cap on the
likelihood of a settlement or the likelihood that the plaintiff prevails at trial. When we re-
strict the sample to cases brought by SME plaintiffs, we again see no statistically significant
change in settlement behavior; however, we see a negative and statistically significant drop
in the likelihood that the plaintiff prevails at trial after the costs cap was introduced. When
we use the sample of cases brought by large plaintiffs instead, again we see no statistically
significant effect on settlements or plaintiff wins. A comparison with OLS results (see Table
H-8 in the Online Appendix), shows that if we ignore the potential selection into settle-
ment, the magnitude of the drop in column (4) is much smaller. These results suggest that
the introduction of a costs cap, and hence the shift away from the English and towards the
American Rule, has led to a decrease in the plaintiff win rate for SME plaintiffs. This result
45The large difference between the IPEC and PHC is due to the fact that the PHC data only contain patent
cases where the likelihood of a plaintiff win is a lot lower than in cases that involve any of the other types of
IP due to the higher complexity of the patent dispute and the higher likelihood that the patent is invalid and
thus not infringed.
46Consider, for example, the difference in win rates between patent cases at the PHC (in which coun-
terclaims are commonly raised) and IPEC cases involving all other types of IP (in which counterclaims are
uncommon), as shown in Figure G-6.
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is consistent with the theoretical prediction in Proposition 3. It also agrees with the findings
by Hughes and Snyder (1995) who found an increase in the win rate following a switch
from the American to the English rule. Note also that, while the effect of the costs cap on
the settlement rate is not statistically significant, it is positive as predicted by Proposition
2.
There is a concern that the settlement rate might be upward biased during the last few
quarters of the sample period due to pending cases. That is, if pending cases are less likely
to settle, having removed pending cases from the sample will lead to a seemingly higher
settlement rate among cases filed later in the sample period. To investigate this concern,
Table H-9 in the Online Appendix shows results when we drop all cases filed in 2013, as
they are the ones most likely to be subject to this selection problem.47 Dropping the last
year of the sample also addresses potential concerns that the introduction of the SCT might
have affected litigation in the IPEC multi-track. The results for all types of plaintiffs and the
result of the subset of large plaintiffs are very similar to those shown in Table 7. However,
there is an important difference with respect to the results for SME plaintiffs. We now
also find a statistically significant increase in settlements following the introduction of the
costs cap while still finding a decrease of the likelihood that the plaintiff prevails at trial.
This positive effect on settlements is in agreement with the finding by Snyder and Hughes
(1990), who found a negative effect on settlements due to a shift in cost allocation in the
opposite direction, i.e., from the American to the English rule.
47An alternative approach to addressing this potential issue is to only include settlements that occurred
within a certain number of months after filing. The problem with this alternative approach is that it would
lead to a significant loss of data even before applying the date restriction because we lack information on
the precise settlement date for slightly more than 20% of cases that settled. Despite having obtained all the
information directly from the court dockets, the termination date can still be missing when parties fail to
notify the court of the date of their settlement agreement. We therefore prefer to account for truncation by
dropping the last available year.
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Table 7: IPEC and PHC: settlement decision and judgment (plaintiff win), 2007-2013
All P SME P Large
Settle P Win Settle P Win Settle P Win
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Costs cap
IPEC -0.038 0.176 -0.309 0.323 0.308 0.053
(0.245) (0.253) (0.405) (0.214) (0.397) (0.386)
Postreform -0.024 0.022 -0.902 1.081** 0.102 -0.207
(0.241) (0.253) (0.656) (0.477) (0.310) (0.269)
IPEC×Postreform 0.148 -0.214 0.961 -1.162*** 0.404 -0.173
(0.213) (0.269) (0.614) (0.444) (0.326) (0.422)
Case characteristics
Case transferred -0.061 -0.236 -0.055 -0.219** 0.080 -0.204
(0.146) (0.172) (0.214) (0.108) (0.281) (0.278)
ln case value 0.0004 0.008 -0.045 0.042 -0.004 -0.124
(0.046) (0.048) (0.070) (0.036) (0.111) (0.116)
Infringement claim 0.112 0.074 -0.180 0.233 0.213 0.108
(0.230) (0.255) (0.426) (0.231) (0.400) (0.448)
Invalidity claim 0.328 0.068 -0.383 0.070 0.568 0.102
(0.223) (0.414) (0.445) (0.240) (0.363) (0.657)
Counterclaim -0.077 -0.370** 0.129
(0.102) (0.173) (0.151)
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff individual 0.191 -0.188 0.336 -0.066 0.176 -0.228
(0.150) (0.257) (0.292) (0.156) (0.482) (0.443)
Defendant individual 0.426*** -0.205 0.580*** -0.060 0.451** -0.105
(0.115) (0.524) (0.172) (0.158) (0.201) (0.437)
Plaintiff Europe -0.124 0.057 -0.031 -0.617 -0.041 -0.048
(0.150) (0.206) (0.618) (0.474) (0.176) (0.144)
Plaintiff World 0.045 -0.188 -0.399 0.418 0.191 -0.310
(0.133) (0.152) (0.636) (0.606) (0.161) (0.206)
Defendant Europe 0.380** -0.232 0.310 0.587** 0.422* -0.136
(0.177) (0.478) (0.447) (0.295) (0.218) (0.369)
Defendant World 0.440*** -0.505 -0.056 -0.608*** 0.515** -0.389
(0.167) (0.528) (0.402) (0.209) (0.208) (0.456)
NPE -0.146 0.002 1.001 -0.918* -0.424 0.148
(0.227) (0.283) (0.895) (0.484) (0.261) (0.409)
Mills ratio -1.004 -0.427 -0.777
(1.638) (0.337) (1.220)
IP type FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time trend (by quarter) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number obs. 812 303 427
Number obs. settled 558 202 301
Notes: Heckman 2-step selection correction OLS regression. Dependent variable in 1st stage equal to one if case settled and in 2nd
stage if plaintiff wins. P SME: plaintiff is SME; P Large: plaintiff is large firm. All regressions include a constant. Time period is 2007-
2013; PHC data contain only patent cases; IPEC trademark cases include passing-off claims; IPEC design cases include registered and
unregistered design rights. Sample excludes cases brought by performance rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited).
IP type FE: dummy variable for each type of IP right (patent, trademark, copyright, registered design, database). Regressions include a
dummy variable equal to one if the case value is missing. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
37
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of fee shift-
ing in civil litigation. We first develop a theoretical model to analyze the effect that fee
shifting rules have on plaintiffs’ decisions to file suit. Our analysis expands on the seminal
litigation model by Bebchuk (1984) in three respects. First, rather than modeling the de-
cisionmaking process of a single plaintiff, we model the effect of fee shifting rules on a set
of heterogeneous potential plaintiffs. Second, our model generates predictions regarding
the observable post-filing settlement rate rather than the (typically) unobservable pre-trial
settlement rate. Third, rather than studying just the American and English rules, we study a
series of cost recovery rules, including a regime that places a cap on the amount of costs that
a party may recover. Importantly, our analysis reveals a new indirect effect not included
in prior models: the effect that a change in cost recovery rules has, not just on individual
plaintiffs, but also indirectly on the set of plaintiffs. Taking these novel considerations into
account, our model suggests that the net effect of a costs cap on the incentives to file a case
are ambiguous but generates clear-cut predictions regarding the impact of a costs cap on
settlement rate, plaintiff win rate, and plaintiff average litigation expenditures whenever
the costs cap yields an increase in case filings.
Next, relying on a recent reform to the rules for awarding fees in IP suits brought in
the UK, we present an empirical analysis of the effect of fee shifting. Our analysis takes
advantage of the introduction of a cap on the amount of costs recoverable in suits litigated
in the IPEC. To identify the effect of the costs cap on litigation, we rely on variation among
case types, distinguishing between patent cases and cases that involve any of the other types
of IP, as well as data on IP cases filed at the PHC, which does not employ a costs cap. Our
findings, which use data for the period 2007-2013, suggest that the introduction of a costs
cap at the IPEC increased the number of suits filed in that court, but decreased the win
rate of SME plaintiffs. There is also some evidence (albeit weaker evidence) that litigation
expenses by large plaintiffs dropped and settlements involving SME plaintiffs increased.
In addition to underscoring the need for further theoretical and empirical research in this
area, our findings are directly relevant to a number of legal developments unfolding across
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the globe. In the U.S. policymakers have on several occasions in recent years considered
legislation that would make two-way fee awards routine in patent suits. In addition, U.S.
policymakers have recently considered establishing one or more venues modeled after the
IPEC for litigating relatively small patent and copyright claims. Finally, despite being home
to the American Rule, the U.S. legal system has already adopted a variety of fee shifting rules
applicable in certain jurisdictions or in cases enforcing certain statutory or constitutional
rights. Important civil litigation reforms are underway in Europe as well, particularly in the
arena of IP enforcement. Europe stands on the precipice of establishing a Unified Patent
Court that would drastically decrease the cost of enforcing patent rights across the continent
and, moreover, place caps on the recovery of litigation expenses much like current practice
in the IPEC. Our findings suggest that the use of costs caps in a European Unified Patent
Court may well increase the overall rate of patent litigation, but in the process may open
the courthouse door for many SMEs that previously found patent assertion prohibitively
costly.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
A Appendix: Legal background
A number of key aspects of the procedures of the IPEC and the PHC are described here in
order to give more information about the legal background of the reforms:
Appellate Structure: Where permission is granted, appeals from the PHC are heard
at the Court of Appeal, where the costs of litigation can easily reach the same level
as the PHC. Meanwhile, depending on the nature of the order being appealed, the
destination of an appeal from the multi-track of the IPEC is either the Court of Appeal
or the PHC - final orders are appealed to the Court of Appeal whereas interim orders
are appealed to the PHC (HMCTS, The Intellectual Property Enterprise Court Guide,
July 2016). IP case appeals from the IPEC to the Court of Appeal are rare due to
the cost involved (if parties have chosen the IPEC due to its limited costs structure,
they are rarely willing to spend hundreds of thousands of pounds appealing the initial
ruling at the Court of Appeal). Moreover, appeals are much more likely in complex
cases i.e. cases suited to the PHC, not the IPEC. Finally, the destination of an appeal
from a decision on the IPEC small claims track is to the IPEC multi-track judge.
Disclosure: Within the PHC there is a wide-ranging disclosure requirement under
the Civil Procedure Rules parts 31-35, which is on-going throughout the duration of
the case, and gives parties the ability to inspect documents belonging to the other
side, perform experiments, call expert witnesses and to engage in extensive cross-
examination. These requirements were present at the pre-reform IPEC as well - how-
ever, post-reforms, in line with the active case management (ACM) that now takes
place at the IPEC – which includes the limiting of claims/submissions – both the re-
quirement of disclosure and the use of expert evidence are now much more limited
at the IPEC level than at the PHC level. Interestingly, in October 2015 the PHC began
a two-year trial run of a ‘Shorter Trial Scheme’ which allows for disclosure and sub-
i
missions to be limited along the lines of IPEC trials (Practice Direction 51N – Shorter
and Flexible Trials Pilot Schemes). In any case, this trial falls outside of the period of
our study.
Remedies: All the remedies available in the PHC are available in the IPEC multi-track
including preliminary and final injunctions, damages, accounts of profits, delivery up,
disclosure, search and seizure and asset freezing. In other words, there are no dif-
ferences in the remedies each court can award (apart from the damages cap, which
restricts the level of damages available at the IPEC). However, the remedies available
in the IPEC small claims track are more limited - it has the power to order final injunc-
tions, and final damage awards, but it does not have the power to issue preliminary
injunctions, search and seizure orders or asset freezing orders.
Cost allocation: In England and Wales the substantive legal issues and the issues of
costs and damages are dealt with separately, and the losing party will typically bear
the brunt of the costs of the case on an issue-cost basis – the so-called ‘loser-pays rule’
(McDonagh and Helmers, 2013a). This issue-based approach works such that each
party will have to pay the costs of the issues they lost at trial. For instance, if a patent
infringement trial concludes with a two-part ruling that (i) the claimant’s patent was
invalid and (ii) the defendant’s activities would have infringed the claimant’s patent
if it had been valid, the claimant would have to pay the costs of the part of the trial
dedicated to the validity issue, and the defendant would have to pay the costs of the
part of the trial dedicated to the infringement issue.
Legal representation: At the IPEC and the PHC litigants may be represented before
courts by appropriately qualified and certified barristers, solicitors, patent attorneys
and trade mark attorneys.48 Legal representation is not required at the IPEC small
claims track level, though parties are free to obtain it if they wish.
48See Right to Conduct Litigation and Rights of Audience 2012.
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B Appendix: Summary of legal changes
The IPEC reforms consisted of several stages, and were staggered over a number of years
between 2010 and 2013:
1. October 2010 – Procedures and Costs cap:
• Procedural changes at the PCC come into force – the most crucial of these are
the introduction of active case management (ACM), early identification of the
issues by the judge, and a limit on the time to be taken at trial;
• Introduction of a recoverable costs scale with a total cap of £50,000 (with an
additional cap of £25,000 relating to hearings concerning damages).
2. June-October 2011 – Damages cap:
• June 2011: £500,000 damages (and accounts of profits) cap is applied to patents
and designs;
• October 2011: £500,000 damages cap is extended to all IP claims.
3. October 2012–April 2013 – Introduction of Small Claims Track and implemen-
tation of Jackson Review costs changes:
• October 2012-April 2013: Introduction of the small claims track (SCT) in Octo-
ber 2012. Under CPR part 63.27 the SCT can hear copyright, trademarks and
passing off, databases, breach of confidence, and unregistered designs matters
– but not cases concerning patents, registered designs and plant variety rights.
The SCT consists of informal hearings heard by a District Court judge without
the need for legal representation. Although final injunctions and damages can
be awarded, interim injunctions are not available on the SCT. Decisions of the
SCT may be appealed to the judge at the IPEC multi-track (MT). SCT claims are
limited to a value of £5,000; SCT Costs recovery – as with all small claims track
matters – is set at a level of £260. In April 2013, the SCT Claims limit was raised
to a value of £10,000.
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• April 2013: General civil litigation reforms (in most cases applicable to both
IPEC and PHC) arising from the Jackson Review come into force. Under the
new rules judges are to apply stricter case management rules – with a focus on
litigant compliance with court directions and orders, such as under CPR 3.1(8)
– and a new proportionality test in the assessment of costs and in the PHC new
costs management and budgeting procedures for cases with claims valued at less
than £2million (CPR 3.12-3.18, PD 3E and CPR 31.5). There are also changes to
costs arrangements between clients and legal representatives – successful par-
ties who have ‘Conditional Fee Agreements’ (CFAs) or ‘after-the-event’ (ATE)
litigation insurance in place can no longer claim the CFA ‘success fee’ and ATE
premium as part of costs recovery from the other side; instead damages-based
agreements (DBAs) are permitted in contentious litigation. In addition, CPR Part
36 (offers to settle) is reformed to include new sanctions aimed at encouraging
early settlement of disputes.
4. October 2013: IPEC
• The Intellectual Property Enterprise court (IPEC) takes over the jurisdiction of
the PCC. The IPEC’s jurisdiction as a specialist court operating within the Chancery
Division of the High Court of England and Wales means that it is now equal to
that of the PHC in virtually all IP matters.49 Thus, in accordance with CPR part 63
and Practice Direction (PD) 63 the IPEC can hear cases concerning patents, de-
signs (registered/unregistered, UK/Community), trademarks (UK/Community),
passing off, copyright, database right, other rights conferred by the Copyright
Designs and Patents Act 1988 and actions for breach of confidence.50
49Fox (2014: 10) noting, however, that unlike the PHC the IPEC cannot hear appeals from decisions of the
UK IPO. See also Section 17 and Schedule 9 of Crime and Courts Act 2013 and Article 3(a) Crime and Courts
Act 2013 (Commencement No.3) Order 2013.
50See MoJ p. 4.
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C Appendix: Model
Proof of Lemma 1
Let us first consider Stage 3. The defendant knows that if he rejects the settlement offer,
there will be a trial that will cost him in expectation:
p(D + Cd + Rp) + (1− p) (Cd − Rd) .
Thus, he accepts to pay an amount S to the plaintiff if and only if
S ≤ p(D + Cd + Rp) + (1− p) (Cd − Rd) .
Denoting S= p(D+ Cd +Rp)+ (1− p) (Cd − Rd) and S¯ = p¯(D+ Cd +Rp)+ (1− p¯) (Cd − Rd),
we can distinguish three cases: (i) If S < S: the settlement offer is always accepted; (ii) if
S > S¯: the settlement offer is never accepted, and (iii) if S ≤ S ≤ S¯: the settlement offer is
accepted by a defendant of type p if and only if
p ≥ S − Cd + Rd
D + Rp + Rd
≡ pˆ(D, Rp, Rd , S).
Intuitively, the probability that a settlement offer involving a given payment S ∈ S, S¯
is accepted by the defendant, i.e., p¯−pˆp¯−p , increases with the damages D and the plaintiff’s
recoverable cost Rp. Also, it decreases with the defendant’s recoverable cost Rd since
∂ pˆ
∂ Rd
=
D+Rp+Cd−S
(D+Rp+Rd)2
≥ 0 for any S ≤ S¯.
Consider now the plaintiff’s choice of the amount S requested from the defendant at
Stage 2. Note first that the plaintiff will never find it strictly optimal to make a settlement
offer involving a payment S < S or S > S¯. A settlement offer such that S < S leads to
strictly lower profit for the plaintiff than a settlement offer such that S = S¯. Moreover, all
settlement offers involving payments S > S¯ lead to the same payoff for the plaintiff as the
settlement offer involving the payment S = S¯. Therefore, we can focus on the range

S, S¯

when solving the plaintiff’s maximization program. Moreover, the plaintiff knows that if
his settlement offer involves a payment S ∈ S, S¯, there is a probability p¯−pˆp¯−p that it will be
v
accepted and a probability
pˆ−p
p¯−p that it will be turned down. If the offer is accepted then the
plaintiff’s payoff is S− cp. If the offer is turned down there will be a trial and the plaintiff’s
expected payoff will be
ρˆ
 
D− Cp + Rp
− (1− ρˆ)  Cp + Rd− cp
where
ρˆ =
pˆ + p¯
2
is the average probability that the plaintiff prevails in court conditionally on the settlement
offer being turned down by the defendant. Therefore, the plaintiff’s expected payoff if he
makes a settlement offer involving a payment S ≤ S¯  D, Rp, Rd is given by
Πˆ(D, Rp, Rd , S) =
p¯− pˆ
p¯− pS +
pˆ− p
p¯− p

ρˆ
 
D− Cp + Rp
− (1− ρˆ)  Cp + Rd− cp.
The assumption p¯− p ≥ Cp+CdD ensures that ∂ Πˆ∂ S

S=S
> 0 for any D ∈ (D, D¯], Rp ∈

0, cp + Cp

and Rd ∈ [0, Cd], which implies that Πˆ(D, Rp, Rd , S) is not maximized at S = S. Solving the
first-order condition ∂ Πˆ∂ S = 0 yields the optimal settlement amount
S∗
 
D, Rp, Rd

= p¯
 
D + Rp + Rd
− Cp − Rd .
The corresponding threshold type is
p∗(D, Rp, Rd) = pˆ(D, Rp, Rd , S∗
 
D, Rp, Rd

) =p¯− Cp + Cd
D + Rp + Rd
.
Proof of Lemma 2
Straightforward computations lead to
Π∗(D, Rp, Rd) = p¯
 
D + Rp + Rd

+
1
2(p¯− p)
 
Cp + Cd
2
D + Rp + Rd
− 1
2
 
Cp + Cd
− Cp − Rd − cp.
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Differentiating this with respect to D leads to
∂Π∗
∂ D
(D, Rp, Rd) = p¯− 12(p¯− p)
 
Cp + Cd
2 
D + Rp + Rd
2 > p¯− 12(p¯− p)
 
Cp + Cd
2
D2
> p¯− p¯− p
2
=
p¯ + p
2
> 0.
This shows that there exists a unique threshold D∗
 
Rp, Rd
≥ D such that a potential plaintiff
files a case if and only if D > D∗
 
Rp, Rd

. Moreover,
∂Π∗
∂ Rp
(D, Rp, Rd) =
∂Π∗
∂ D
(D, Rp, Rd)> 0
and
∂Π∗
∂ Rd
(D, Rp, Rd) = p¯− 12(p¯− p)
 
Cp + Cd
2 
D + Rp + Rd
2 − 1< 0,
which implies that D∗
 
Rp, Rd

is decreasing in Rp and increasing in Rd .
Proof of Lemma 3
We have shown in the proof of Lemma 2 that ∂Π∗/∂ Rp > 0 and ∂Π∗/∂ Rd < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1
It is straightforward that if Π∗(D, R¯, R¯)−Π∗(D, Cp, Cd) is positive (resp. negative) for any
D then D∗
 
R¯, R¯

is less (resp. greater) than D∗
 
Cp, Cd

or, equivalently, the number of case
filings under the costs cap is larger (resp. smaller) than in the absence of the costs cap.
This shows that if Π∗(D, R¯, R¯) − Π∗(D, Cp, Cd) is ambiguous then D∗
 
R¯, R¯
 − D∗  Cp, Cd is
ambiguous too, which means that the impact of the costs cap on case filings is ambiguous.
Sufficient conditions for the impact of the costs cap on case filings to be positive or
negative
We have
−  cp + Cp− R¯max ∂Π∗
∂ Rp
≤ Π∗(D, R¯, R¯)−Π∗(D, cp + Cp, R¯)≤ −
 
cp + Cp
− R¯min ∂Π∗
∂ Rp
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and
 
Cd − R¯

min
∂Π∗∂ Rd
≤ Π∗(D, cp + Cp, R¯)−Π∗(D, cp + Cp, Cd)≤  Cd − R¯max ∂Π∗∂ Rd
 .
Summing these two double inequalities leads to
Π∗(D, R¯, R¯)−Π∗(D, cp + Cp, Cd)≥ −
 
cp + Cp
− R¯max ∂Π∗
∂ Rp
+
 
Cd − R¯

min
∂Π∗∂ Rd

and
Π∗(D, R¯, R¯)−Π∗(D, cp + Cp, Cd)≤ −
 
cp + Cp
− R¯min ∂Π∗
∂ Rp
+
 
Cd − R¯

max
∂Π∗∂ Rd
 .
Thus, a sufficient condition for Π∗(D, R¯, R¯)−Π∗(D, cp + Cp, Cd) > 0 or, equivalently, for the
costs cap to generate an increase in case filings, is that
−  cp + Cp− R¯max ∂Π∗
∂ Rp
+
 
Cd − R¯

min
∂Π∗∂ Rd
> 0,
which can be rewritten as
 
cp + Cp
− R¯<  Cd − R¯min
 ∂Π∗∂ Rd 
max ∂Π
∗
∂ Rp
.
This inequality can be interpreted as meaning that the reduction in plaintiffs’ recoverable
costs resulting from the costs cap is sufficiently small relative to the reduction in defendants’
recoverable costs.
Similarly, a sufficient condition for Π∗(D, R¯, R¯)−Π∗(D, cp + Cp, Cd) < 0 or, equivalently,
for the costs cap to generate a decrease in case filings, is that
−  cp + Cp− R¯min ∂Π∗
∂ Rp
+
 
Cd − R¯

max
∂Π∗∂ Rd
< 0,
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which we can rewrite as
 
cp + Cp
− R¯>  Cd − R¯max
 ∂Π∗∂ Rd 
min ∂Π
∗
∂ Rp
.
We can interpret this inequality as meaning that the reduction in plaintiffs’ recoverable
costs resulting from the costs cap is sufficiently large relative to the reduction in defendants’
recoverable costs.
Let us now use an alternative decomposition of Π∗(D, R¯, R¯)−Π∗(D, cp + Cp, Cd) to show
that the impact of the costs cap on case filings is positive if total litigation costs is large
enough. We can write Π∗(D, R¯, R¯)−Π∗(D, cp + Cp, Cd) as
 
cp + Cp + Cd − 2R¯
  cp + Cp + Cd2
2(p¯− p)  D + 2R¯  D + cp + Cp + Cd − p¯

︸ ︷︷ ︸
can be either >0 or <0
+ Cd − R¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
Thus, the impact of the costs cap on the plaintiff’s expected gain from filing a case is the
sum of a term that can be either positive or negative, depending on the size of litigation
costs, and a term that is always positive. However, the ratio (
cp+Cp+Cd)2
2(p¯−p)(D+2R¯)(D+cp+Cp+Cd) goes to
infinity when cp + Cp + Cd goes to infinity (holding fixed D), which implies that the first
term in the decomposition is positive whenever cp +Cp +Cd is sufficiently large (relative to
the upper bound of damages D¯). In this case, Π∗(D, R¯, R¯)−Π∗(D, cp +Cp, Cd) is positive for
any D ∈ (D, D¯], which implies that the costs cap generates an increase in case filings.
Proof of Lemma 4
The optimal investment level x∗(β , Rp, Rd) for a plaintiff of type β is such that
∂ D
∂ x
 
x∗(β , Rp, Rd),β
 ∂Π∗
∂ D
 
D
 
x∗(β , Rp, Rd),β

, Rp, Rd

= 1 (8)
Differentiating this with respect to β leads to
∂ 2D
∂ x2
.
∂ x∗
∂ β
∂Π∗
∂ D
+
∂ 2D
∂ x∂ β
+

∂ D
∂ x
2 ∂ 2Π∗
∂ D2
∂ x∗
∂ β
= 0
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that is,
∂ x∗
∂ β
=
− ∂ 2D∂ x∂ β
∂ 2D
∂ x2
∂Π∗
∂ D +
 
∂ D
∂ x
2 ∂ 2Π∗
∂ D2
The denominator is negative because Π∗(D (x ,β) , Rp, Rd) is concave. This, combined with
our assumption that ∂ D∂ x (x ,β) is increasing in β , implies that
∂ x∗
∂ β > 0.
Let us now differentiate (8) with respect to Rp:
∂ 2D
∂ x2
∂ x∗
∂ Rp
∂Π∗
∂ D
+
∂ 2Π∗
∂ D2

∂ D
∂ x
2 ∂ x∗
∂ Rp
+
∂ D
∂ x
∂ 2Π∗
∂ D∂ Rp
= 0
which yields
∂ x∗
∂ Rp
=
− ∂ 2Π∗∂ D∂ Rp
∂ 2D
∂ x2
∂Π∗
∂ D +
 
∂ D
∂ x
2 ∂ 2Π∗
∂ D2
Therefore, ∂ x
∗
∂ Rp
has the same sign as
∂ 2Π∗
∂ D∂ Rp
=
 
Cp + Cd
2
p¯− p
1 
D + Rp + Rd
3 > 0.
Likewise, we can show that ∂ x
∗
∂ Rd
> 0. Thus, the costs cap leads to a decrease in the investment
of any given plaintiff.
Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that the costs cap leads to an increase in case filings, i.e. β∗
 
R¯, R¯

< β∗
 
cp + Cp, Cd

.
The difference between the average investment under the cap and its counterpart in the ab-
sence of a cap is given by
∆≡
∫ β¯
β∗(R¯,R¯) x
∗(β , R¯, R¯)dβ
β¯ − β∗  R¯, R¯ −
∫ β¯
β∗(cp+Cp ,Cd) x
∗(β , cp + Cp, Cd)dβ
β¯ − β∗  cp + Cp, Cd .
Since x∗(β , Rp, Rd) is increasing in Rp and Rd , we have that x∗(β , R¯, R¯)< x∗(β , cp + Cp, Cd)
and, therefore,
∆≤
∫ β¯
β∗(R¯,R¯) x
∗(β , R¯, R¯)dβ
β¯ − β∗  R¯, R¯ −
∫ β¯
β∗(cp+Cp ,Cd) x
∗(β , R¯, R¯)dβ
β¯ − β∗  cp + Cp, Cd . (9)
x
Notice that
1
β¯ − β∗  R¯, R¯
∫ β¯
β∗(R¯,R¯)
x∗(β , R¯, R¯)dβ
=
β∗
 
cp + Cp, Cd
− β∗  R¯, R¯
β¯ − β∗  R¯, R¯
∫ β∗(cp+Cp ,Cd)
β∗(R¯,R¯) x
∗(β , R¯, R¯)dβ
β∗
 
cp + Cp, Cd
− β∗  R¯, R¯
+
β¯ − β∗  cp + Cp, Cd
β¯ − β∗  R¯, R¯
∫ β¯
β∗(cp+Cp ,Cd) x
∗(β , R¯, R¯)dβ
β¯ − β∗  cp + Cp, Cd .
From the fact that x∗(β , Rp, Rd) is increasing in β and that β∗
 
R¯, R¯

< β∗
 
cp + Cp, Cd

, it
follows that ∫ β¯
β∗(R¯,R¯) x
∗(β , R¯, R¯)dβ
β∗
 
cp + Cp, Cd
− β∗  R¯, R¯ <
∫ β¯
β∗(cp+Cp ,Cd) x
∗(β , R¯, R¯)dβ
β¯ − β∗  cp + Cp, Cd .
Therefore,
∫ β¯
β∗(R¯,R¯) x
∗(β , R¯, R¯)dβ
β¯ − β∗  R¯, R¯ < β
∗  cp + Cp, Cd− β∗  R¯, R¯
β¯ − β∗  R¯, R¯
∫ β¯
β∗(cp+Cp ,Cd) x
∗(β , R¯, R¯)dβ
β¯ − β∗  cp + Cp, Cd
+
β¯ − β∗  cp + Cp, Cd
β¯ − β∗  R¯, R¯
∫ β¯
β∗(cp+Cp ,Cd) x
∗(β , R¯, R¯)dβ
β¯ − β∗  cp + Cp, Cd
=
∫ β¯
β∗(cp+Cp ,Cd) x
∗(β , R¯, R¯)dβ
β¯ − β∗  cp + Cp, Cd .
This, combined with (9), implies that ∆ ≤ 0, i.e. the costs cap leads to a decrease in the
average investment of a plaintiff that files a claim.
Extension to asymmetric stakes
We assumed in our baseline model that a plaintiff who prevails in court receives a pay-
ment D from the defendant or, equivalently, that the benefit derived by a plaintiff who
prevails in court is equal to the loss of the defendant he is facing. In this extension we as-
sume that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff leads to a gain for the plaintiff Bp ∈
h
Bp, Bp
i
that is potentially different from the loss Ld ∈

Ld , Ld

incurred by the defendant. Such
asymmetric stakes are relevant for instance if the court awards an injunction to the plain-
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tiff. We assume that the values of Bp and Lp associated to a given dispute are known to
both the plaintiff and the defendant.
We now show below that our analysis can be extended to the scenario described above.
Let us first consider the defendant’s decision to accept or turn down a given settlement
offer. The defendant knows that if he rejects the settlement offer, there will be a trial that
will cost him in expectation:
p(Ld + Cd + Rp) + (1− p) (Cd − Rd) .
Thus, he accepts to pay an amount S to the plaintiff if and only if
S ≤ p(Ld + Cd + Rp) + (1− p) (Cd − Rd) .
Denoting S= p(Ld +Cd +Rp)+(1− p) (Cd − Rd) and S¯ = p¯(D+Cd +Rp)+(1− p¯) (Cd − Rd),
we can distinguish three cases: (i) if S < S: the settlement offer is always accepted, (ii) if
S > S¯, the settlement offer is never accepted, and (iii) if S ≤ S ≤ S¯: the settlement offer is
accepted by a defendant of type p if and only if
p ≥ S − Cd + Rd
Ld + Rp + Rd
≡ pˆ(Ld , Rp, Rd , S).
Consider now the plaintiff’s choice of the amount S requested from the defendant at Stage
2. The plaintiff’s expected payoff if he makes a settlement offer S ∈ S, S¯ involving a
payment S ≤ S¯  D, Rp, Rd is given by
Πˆ(Bp, Ld , Rp, Rd , S) =
p¯− pˆ
p¯− pS +
pˆ− p
p¯− p

ρˆ
 
Bp − Cp + Rp
− (1− ρˆ)  Cp + Rd− cp.
where ρˆ = 12 (pˆ + p¯) is the probability that the plaintiff prevails in court conditional on the
settlement offer being turned down. To avoid a corner solution S = S (which would lead
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to all cases being settled), we assume that
1
p¯− p ≤
Bp
Cp + Cd
.
Solving the plaintiff’s maximization program leads to an equilibrium threshold:
p∗
 
Bp, Ld , Rp, Rd

=
p¯− Cp+CdLd+Rp+Rd
1+
Ld−Bp
Ld+Rp+Rd
=
p¯
 
Ld + Rp + Rd
−  Cp + Cd
2Ld + Rp + Rd − Bp .
and an equilibrium settlement amount
S∗(Bp, Ld , Rp, Rd) = p∗
 
Bp, Ld , Rp, Rd
  
Ld + Rp + Rd

+ Cd − Rd .
Considering now the first stage of the game, a potential plaintiff files the case if and only if
Π∗(Bp, Ld , Rp, Rd)≡ Πˆ(Bp, Ld , Rp, Rd , S∗
 
Bp, Ld , Rp, Rd

)> 0.
Similar to the baseline model, one can show that there exists a unique threshold B∗p
 
Ld , Rp, Rd

such that a potential plaintiff files a case if and only if
Bp > B
∗
p
 
Ld , Rp, Rd

.
Importantly, this threshold is decreasing in Rp and increasing in Rd as is the threshold
D∗(Rp, Rd) in the baseline model.
We now investigate the way the equilibrium threshold p∗ depends on Bp, Ld , Rp and
Rd , which determines the way the equilibrium probability of settlement for a given plaintiff
depends on Bp, Ld , Rp and Rd . First, it is clear that p
∗ is increasing in Bp. Moreover, straight-
forward calculations also show that p∗ is increasing in Ld . These two results generalize the
finding in the baseline model that p∗ increases with D. Second, simple calculations show
that p∗ increases in Rp and Rd , as is the case in the baseline model, if
Bp < Ld +
Cp + Cd
p¯
. (10)
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Thus, we have established that the key qualitative properties of the baseline model, i.e.
the way the equilibrium number of case filings depends on recoverable costs, and the way
the equilibrium (individual) probability of settlement depends on stakes and recoverable
costs are preserved as long as Condition (10) is satisfied. This condition always holds when
the plaintiff’s gain from a favorable judgment is less than, or equal to, the defendant’s loss,
and is satisfied in the scenario in which the plaintiff’s gain is larger than the defendant’s loss
as long as the difference between them is not too large. In the latter scenario, an alternative
interpretation of Condition (10) is that litigation costs are large enough.
D Appendix: Data
D.1 IPEC 2007-2013
We collected information on all IP cases filed at the IPEC for the entire period 2007-13.
In order to do this, we first compiled the physical IPEC court records/files and associated
information for all cases filed 2007-13; secondly, we used a set of specially devised IP right-
specific spreadsheets to extract and organize the relevant information gathered from these
often extremely detailed and complex records; thirdly, we compiled the different files into
a single database. Nonetheless, because the record keeping at the IPEC is largely paper-
based, it is not uncommon for case files to be misfiled, or to go missing altogether. For
this reason there are a very small number of cases for which we were unable to obtain
any information except for the case number. Nonetheless, we are confident that we have
examined every possible physical IPEC case file for 2007-13. To double check, in September
2014 we examined the available IPEC judgments for 2007-13 online (via BAILII); we did
not find any cases that we did not already have a record of from our search of the physical
files.
For IPEC cases, the information that we collected on IP cases filed 2007-13 contains
detailed information on the start date of the case, the initial and counter claims (infringe-
ment, revocation etc.), the names of the litigating parties, information on the relevant IP
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right (including patent numbers, trade mark numbers etc.), and the outcomes of the cases.
We also gathered information on whether cases were transferred from the IPEC to the PHC
or vice versa. These data were collected during the period September 2013-July 2014 and
these spreadsheets are up to date in terms of outcomes (decided cases, settlements etc.) up
to July 2014.
D.2 PHC
We collected the same set of information on patent cases at the PHC as for the IPEC for
the entire 2007-2013 period. For all other IP rights (trademark, design, copyright, and
database related disputes), we collected only the following streamlined data for all PHC
cases filed 2009-2013:
• Case numbers;
• Parties to the claim;
• Initial claim(s);
• Type of IP right(s) litigated – noting differences within IP rights where relevant – for
instance, whether the right was a Community trademark, or a UK trademark (regis-
tered or unregistered), or a UK or Community unregistered/registered design right.
Similar to the IPEC data collection, we undertook a number of checks to ensure the
completeness of the patent data:
• For the years 2011 and 2012, we were able to cross-reference patent cases via a list
that the law firm Powell-Gilbert had provided us of case file numbers drawn from a
physical search of files they had undertaken during early 2013.
• We used the Patents Court Diary in order to cross-reference the listed cases with what
we found in the physical records to ensure no cases were missed.
• We liaised with HMCTS regarding their published records for the amount of PHC
cases filed per year. However, on completion of the search what we found was that
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the published HMCTS statistics are not an accurate reflection of the amount of cases
actually filed per year.
• As with the IPEC, from September-October 2014 we examined the available PHC
patent judgments for 2007-13 online (via BAILII). Thus, as with the IPEC, while there
are a very small number of patent PHC cases for which we are missing data, we are
confident that our PHC dataset comprehensively includes all available physical and
online records.
D.3 Case Data Consolidation
We additionally examined IPEC and PHC cases to identify relationships among cases. For
purposes of data collection, we merged all pairs (or groups) of cases that were litigated (1)
contemporaneously, (2) between the same two parties, and (3) to address alleged infringe-
ment of the same patent rights. In all, we identified 23 groups (comprised of 62 total cases)
that met all three criteria.
The 23 groups of cases that we merged fall into three categories. First, 17 groups con-
sist of related cases in which the same patent or patents were asserted against and chal-
lenged by the same alleged infringer in separate, parallel law suits. Consider, for example,
HC08C02525 and HC08C03143. In HC08C02525, Nokia sued IPCom to challenge the va-
lidity of two patents. In HC08C03143, IPCom sued Nokia for infringing the same two
patents. Such cases are substantively indistinguishable from a set of claim(s) and coun-
terclaim(s) litigated in a single case, and frequently such cases are consolidated together
shortly after filing.
Second, we merged three sets of coordinated cases filed by generic pharmaceutical com-
panies to challenge IP rights to branded pharmaceuticals. Two were pairs of cases in which
a generic pharmaceutical company filed one suit to challenge a branded pharmaceutical
company’s patent rights, and later filed an additional suit to challenge “supplementary pro-
tection certificates” (SPCs) obtained by the branded pharmaceutical company to extend the
previously challenged patents. In the third set, one generic pharmaceutical company filed
six separate cases against six nation-specific subsidiaries of the same branded pharmaceu-
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tical company parent.
Finally, we merged three additional sets of duplicate cases. Each group consists of cases
filed by the same claimant, alleging the same claims, against the same defendant. To pro-
vide one example, consider HC11C01030 and HC11C01423. Both cases were filed by the
UK government to challenge a patent owned by Servier Labs, but the first claim was never
served on Servier and was later dropped in favor of the second.
E Appendix: Variable Description
This appendix describes the construction of the variables used in our analysis.
• Dependent variables
– Size of legal counsel: we collected information on the number of attorneys em-
ployed by the law firms that represent the plaintiffs and defendants in a given
case and then coded six size categories: (1) 1-5 attorneys, (2) 6-10 attorneys,
(3) 11-50 attorneys, (4) 51-200 attorneys, (5) 201-500 attorneys, and (6) above
500 attorneys.
– Plaintiff win: the outcome of a case is coded as equal to one if the court hands
down a decision and the plaintiffs prevails on the core issue of the dispute.
– Settlement: the outcome of a case is coded as settlement if the court does not
hand down a decision. Settlements include court settlements as well as out-of-
court settlements.
• Case characteristics
– Case transferred: the variable is equal to one if a case was transferred to the IPEC
from another court or cases were transferred between the IPEC and the PHC.
– Case value: the litigating parties specify the value of the case on the claim form.
– Infringement claim: the variable is equal to one if the plaintiff alleges infringe-
ment of the IP right.
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– Invalidity claim: the variable is equal to one if the plaintiff alleges that the IP
right is invalid.
– Counterclaim: the variable is equal to one if the defendant files a counterclaim;
for example in a patent case, if the plaintiff alleges infringement, the defendant
may file a counterclaim alleging the invalidity of the asserted patent.
• Litigant characteristics
– Size: we categorized companies according to the EU definition into four size
categories using a combination of the number of employees, turnover, and to-
tal assets. If several companies from the same business group appeared as co-
plaintiffs or co-defendants, we allocated the entire business group into the size
category of its largest member.
– Individual: the variable is equal to one of at least one of the plaintiffs or defen-
dants in a case is a private individual.
– Residence: we identified a company’s origin using information available in the
court records, Bureau van Dijk’s FAME and Amadeus databases, as well as web
searches. We then allocated companies into three categories: domestic (UK),
Europe, and rest of the world.
– Non-practicing entity (NPE): we identified NPEs by identifying the patent holder
in each case and we then determined manually, using web searches, news re-
ports, court filings, and the existing academic literature on NPEs and PAEs whether
a patent holder was an NPE at the time of the court case. For more details see
Love et al. (2016).
F Appendix: Factors Affecting Forum Selection and Litiga-
tion Time Trends
This appendix identifies a number of general factors that could lead to time trends in case
filings and/or affect claimants’ choice of forum. For each, we provide relevant qualitative
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information and point to related controls used in our empirical analysis.
Table F-1: Differences between IPEC and PHC (2007-2013)
Factors IPEC vs PHC Changes 2007-2013 Relevant Variables
Substantive Law/
Statutes
Precedent
Both IPEC and PHC cases
are governed by the same UK
statutes, e.g., Copyright,
Designs & Patents Act of 1988;
Trade Marks Acts of 1994.
IPEC interim rulings are
appealable to PHC, and
both IPEC and PHC final
rulings are appealable to the
Court of Appeals followed by
the House of Lords/Supreme
Court.
No substantive IP reform
legislation was enacted
during this period.
Rulings by the PHC,
COA, or House of Lords/
Supreme Court are equally
binding on both courts.
IP type FE
IP type FE,
Quarter/Month FE
Procedural
Rules
Subject to the procedural
changes listed in Appendix A,
both IPEC and PHC
litigants may:
- pursue a counterclaim
- provide/inspect disclosure
- perform/inspect experiments
- prepare witness statements
and expert reports
- hold a trial
- recover costs, etc.
For a detailed overview of
procedural changes, see
Appendix A.
Litigant size,
Litigant individual,
Litigant residence,
NPE status,
IP type FE,
Quarter/Month FE
Decision-makers
Neither court conducts jury
trials. All cases filed in the IPEC
are assigned to the same judge.
The Chancery Division of the
HC consists of more than a
dozen judges, the majority of
which are eligible to sit on the
PHC. Technical complexity is
also taken into account when
assigning PHC cases.
Judges of the IPEC:
- Fysh, 2001-2010
- Birss, 2010-2013
- Hacon, 2013-present
For a list of judges on the
HC Chancery Division, see
https://www.judiciary.uk/
you-and-the-judiciary/going-
to-court/high-court/the-
chancery-division/judges/.
Within-IPEC analysis,
IPEC dummy variable,
IP type FE,
Quarter/Month FE
Location
IPEC and PHC are both
located in London, and cover
the same geographic
jurisdiction (England and
Wales).
Both courts were located in
London and covered the
same jurisdiction during the
entire period of our study.
Litigant residence
Legal Representation
IP Business
Models
Litigants in both courts may be
represented by barristers,
solicitors, patent attorneys, and
trade mark attorneys.
IP licensing specialists may file
suit in both courts.
No changes to legal
representation rules were
made during this period.
During this period, NPE
patent litigation remained
stable in both absolute and
relative terms. (Helmers,
et al., 2014). As discussed
above, we exclude cases
filed by the copyright
licensing entity PPL.
Litigant size,
Litigant individual,
IP type FE
NPE status,
IP type FE,
Quarter/Month FE
Industry,
Technology,
Business
Cycle
Neither court’s jurisdiction is
restricted by industry or
technology.
Both courts have retained
the same jurisdiction (both
geographic and subject
matter) during the entire
period of our study.
Litigant size,
Litigant individual,
Litigant residence,
NPE status,
IP type FE,
Quarter/Month FE
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G Appendix: Figures
Figure G-1: Costs awarded at IPEC
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Notes: Data only available in cases with costs award following a costs hearing (17 patent cases and 84 cases involving any other type of
IP). Excludes settled cases. Cost awards in British Pound.
Figure G-2: Case transfers between IPEC-PHC
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Notes: Excludes cases brought by performance rights organization PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited).
xx
Figure G-3: Comparison within IPEC: patent cases vs all other IP
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Notes: Case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organization PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited).
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Figure G-4: Comparison IPEC-PHC: discontinuity in patent case filings and all other IP case
filings
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Notes: For PHC no data available for trademarks, design, copyright, and database rights prior to 2009; case counts exclude cases brought
by performance rights organization PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited).
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Figure G-5: Litigation expenses measured as size of legal counsel
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of court cases where parties have employed legal counsel that was allocated in one of six size
categories depending on the number of attorneys employed by the law firm representing plaintiffs or defendants: (1) 1-5 attorneys, (2)
6-10 attorneys, (3) 11-50 attorneys, (4) 51-200 attorneys, (5) 201-500 attorneys, and (6) above 500 attorneys.
Figure G-6: Comparison of plaintiff win rate in decided vs settled cases at IPEC and PHC
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Notes: Data on whether plaintiff prevailed in settlement available at PHC for 20 cases (23.5% of all settled cases) before the introduction
of the costs cap and 9 cases (8.5%) afterwards, at the IPEC for 35 cases (30.7%) before the introduction of the costs cap and 165 cases
(52.2%) afterwards.
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H Appendix: Tables
Table H-1: IPEC an PHC case counts, 2007-2013: all cases incl. PPL cases
Year Patent Trademark Design Copyright Database Total
IPEC PHC IPEC PHC IPEC PHC IPEC PHC IPEC PHC IPEC PHC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2007 6 32 7 7 11 0 31 32
2008 4 70 17 3 31 0 55 70
2009 8 49 61 66 16 14 30 265 2 4 117 398
2010 8 48 45 107 18 42 37 156 2 16 110 369
2011 27 87 56 107 27 21 56 324 3 22 169 561
2012 26 73 81 97 39 13 52 271 1 7 199 461
2013 17 51 87 60 47 19 66 241 4 6 221 377
Total 96 410 354 437 157 109 283 1,257 12 55 902 2,268
Notes: For PHC no data available for trademarks, design, copyright, and database rights prior to 2009; trademark case count includes
passing-off claims; design cases includes registered and unregistered design rights. Only cases counted for which filing date available.
Table H-2: IPEC an PHC case counts, 2007-2013: all cases (including cases dropped by
plaintiffs, cases where service not acknowledged by defendant etc.) excl. PPL cases
Year Patent Trademark Design Copyright Database Total
IPEC PHC IPEC PHC IPEC PHC IPEC PHC IPEC PHC IPEC PHC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2007 6 32 7 7 10 0 30 32
2008 4 70 17 3 30 0 54 70
2009 8 49 61 66 16 14 29 57 2 4 116 190
2010 8 48 45 107 18 42 36 66 2 16 109 279
2011 27 87 56 107 27 21 55 76 3 22 168 313
2012 26 73 81 97 39 13 48 49 1 7 195 239
2013 17 51 87 59 47 19 63 63 4 6 218 198
Total 96 410 354 436 157 109 271 311 12 55 890 1,321
Notes: For PHC no data available for trademarks, design, copyright, and database rights prior to 2009; trademark case count includes
passing-off claims; design cases includes registered and unregistered design rights. Case counts exclude cases brought by performance
rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). Only cases counted for which filing date available.
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Table H-3: IPEC: total number of patent vs all other IP court cases by month, 2007-2013
Patents vs All other IP
All P SME P Large
(1) (2) (3)
Patent 16.681*** 10.632*** 15.920***
(3.398) (3.215) (3.130)
Postreform -0.351* -0.019 -0.394
(0.204) (0.203) (0.263)
Patent×Postreform 0.848*** 0.311 0.597**
(0 .273) (0.263) (0.301)
Time trend (quarterly) YES YES YES
Time trend × Patent YES YES YES
R2 0.765 0.615 0.631
Number obs. 162 162 162
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable log(number of cases by month +1). P SME: plaintiff is SME; P Large: plaintiff is large firm.
All regressions include a constant. Time period 2007-2013; trademark case count includes passing-off claims; design cases includes
registered and unregistered design rights. Case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organisation PPL (Phonographic
Performance Limited). Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table H-4: IPEC and PHC: total number court cases by month, 2007-2013
Patents All other IP
All P SME P Large All P SME P Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IPEC -1.139*** -0.228** -1.159*** -0.380** -0.092 -0.747***
(0.103) (0.090) (0.092) (0.167) (0.178) (0.259)
Postreform 0.404 0.139 0.586 -0.117 -1.332** 1.222
(0.956) (0.289) (0.595) (0.328) (0.506) (0.825)
IPEC×Postreform 0.290** 0.413*** -0.074 0.350* 0.504** 0.317
(0.139) (0.135) (0.141) (0.193) (0.225) (0.293)
IP type FE YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.805 0.564 0.831 0.823 0.727 0.796
Number obs. 164 164 164 138 138 138
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable log(number of cases by month +1). P SME: plaintiff is SME; P Large: plaintiff is large firm.
All regressions include a constant. Time period for all IP is 2009-2013 because no data are available for trade marks, design, copyright
and database rights at the PHC prior to 2009; data for patent cases for 2007-2013; trademark case count includes passing-off claims;
design cases includes registered and unregistered design rights. Case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organisation
PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). IP type FE: dummy variable for each type of IP right (patent, trademark, copyright, registered
design, database). Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table H-5: IPEC and PHC: total number of patent vs all other IP court cases by month,
2007-2013
IPEC vs PHC: Patents vs All other IP
All P SME P Large
(1) (2) (3)
IPEC -0.011 0.084 -0.511**
(0.209) (0.130) (0.206)
Patent 0.016 -0.278** -0.056
(0.226) (0.132) (0.218)
Postreform 2.906*** 1.088*** 2.908***
(0.519) (0.209) (0.459)
IPEC×Postreform -0.991*** 0.186 -1.157***
(0.227) (0.174) (0.228)
IPEC×Patent -1.076*** -0.303* -0.597**
(0.264) (0.171) (0.254)
Patent×Postreform -1.709*** -0.738*** -1.641***
(0.243) (0.171) (0.240)
IPEC×Patent×Postreform 1.231*** 0.217 1.031***
(0.294) (0.229) (0.293)
Quarter FE YES YES YES
R2 0.727 0.617 0.731
Number obs. 336 336 336
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable log(number of cases by month +1). P SME: plaintiff is SME; P Large: plaintiff is large firm.
All regressions include a constant. Time period for all IP is 2009-2013 because no data are available for trademarks, design, copyright
and database rights at the PHC prior to 2009; data for patent cases for 2007-2013; trademark case count includes passing-off claims;
design cases includes registered and unregistered design rights. Case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organisation
PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table H-7: IPEC and PHC: differences in means, 2007-2013
All P SME P Large
Mean Diff. Mean Diff. Mean Diff.
PHC IPEC PHC IPEC PHC IPEC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Case characteristics
Case transferred 0.017 0.250 -0.232*** 0.024 0.225 -0.200*** 0.017 0.195 -0.178***
ln case value 1.360 6.050 -4.689*** 4.104 5.811 -1.706* 0.840 6.317 -5.477***
Infringement claim 0.478 0.936 -0.457*** 0.585 0.938 -0.353*** 0.459 0.948 -0.489***
Invalidity claim 0.471 0.061 0.409*** 0.243 0.053 0.190*** 0.519 0.082 0.436***
Counterclaim 0.708 0.498 0.210*** 0.707 0.496 0.211* 0.721 0.505 0.215***
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff individual 0.032 0.183 -0.151*** 0.048 0.080 -0.031 0.012 0.025 -0.012
Defendant individual 0.046 0.496 -0.449*** 0.097 0.519 -0.421*** 0.038 0.479 -0.440***
Plaintiff Europe 0.316 0.063 0.252*** 0.048 0.015 0.033 0.364 0.154 0.210***
Plaintiff World 0.327 0.112 0.214*** 0.073 0.019 0.054** 0.377 0.283 0.094**
Defendant Europe 0.320 0.024 0.295*** 0.170 0.030 0.140*** 0.351 0.020 0.331***
Defendant World 0.334 0.033 0.300*** 0.170 0.049 0.121*** 0.369 0.015 0.353***
NPE 0.129 0.011 0.118*** 0.048 0.003 0.044*** 0.141 0.010 0.131***
Number of obs. 278 534 41 262 233 194
Notes: Notes: P SME: plaintiff is SME; P Large: plaintiff is large firm. PHC data contain only patent cases; trademark case count
includes passing-off claims; design cases includes registered and unregistered design rights. Excludes cases brought by performance
rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). Cases at the IPEC and PHC (patents) excluded if the plaintiff dropped the
case unilaterally (no settlement) or only a claim form was filed and there is no response by the defendant or other actions by the plaintiff.
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Table H-8: IPEC and PHC: settlement decision and judgment (plaintiff win) OLS, 2007-
2013
All P SME P Large
Settle P Win Settle P Win Settle P Win
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Costs cap
IPEC 0.008 0.163 0.076 0.275 -0.110 0.200
(0.082) (0.155) (0.125) (0.256) (0.132) (0.273)
Postreform 0.004 0.012 0.217 0.719** -0.042 -0.153
(0.080) (0.147) (0.164) (0.289) (0.102) (0.195)
IPEC×Postreform -0.043 -0.122 -0.225 -0.816*** -0.133 0.017
(0.072) (0.121) (0.152) (0.202) (0.102) (0.214)
Case characteristics
Case transferred 0.019 -0.289*** 0.020 -0.250** -0.030 -0.149
(0.048) (0.083) (0.071) (0.119) (0.078) (0.193)
ln case value 0.00003 0.005 0.018 0.021 0.002 -0.123
(0.017) (0.028) (0.035) (0.033) (0.026) (0.076)
Infringement claim -0.040 0.119 0.062 0.136 -0.065 0.301
(0.077) (0.140) (0.131) (0.286) (0.118) (0.185)
Invalidity claim 0.113 0.269** 0.132 -0.038 -0.186* 0.480***
(0.078) (0.117) (0.140) (0.216) (0.109) (0.138)
Counterclaim 0.026 0.126** -0.040
(0.034) (0.056) (0.046)
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff individual 0.061 -0.064 -0.110 0.020 -0.050 -0.079
(0.052) (0.081) (0.113) (0.150) (0.179) (0.286)
Defendant individual -0.138*** 0.104 -0.189*** 0.105 0.127** 0.146
(0.038) (0.064) (0.057) (0.089) (0.059) (0.144)
Plaintiff Europe 0.039 -0.026 0.041 -0.586* 0.015 -0.061
(0.048) (0.099) (0.211) (0.323) (0.055) (0.114)
Plaintiff World -0.013 -0.149* 0.089 0.233 -0.060 -0.211**
(0.043) (0.080) (0.119) (0.425) (0.051) (0.104)
Defendant Europe -0.126* 0.039 -0.130 0.655** -0.136* 0.068
(0.064) (0.102) (0.140) (0.299) (0.081) (0.123)
Defendant World -0.149** -0.200 -0.011 -0.614*** -0.168** -0.119
(0.058) (0.109) (0.089) (0.198) (0.075) (0.124)
NPE 0.045 -0.092 -0.297 -0.630 0.139* -0.077
(0.076) (0.145) (0.255) (0.395) (0.083) (0.171)
IP type FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time trend (by quarter) YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.070 0.254 0.180 0.464 0.104 0.281
Number obs. 812 254 303 101 427 126
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable in columns (1), (3), and (5) equal to one if case settled and in columns (2), (4), (6) if
plaintiff wins. P SME: plaintiff is SME; P Large: plaintiff is large firm. All regressions include a constant. Time period is 2007-2013; PHC
data contain only patent cases; IPEC trademark cases include passing-off claims; IPEC design cases include registered and unregistered
design rights. Sample excludes cases brought by performance rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). IP type FE:
dummy variable for each type of IP right (patent, trademark, copyright, registered design, database). Regressions include a dummy
variable equal to one if the case value is missing. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table H-9: IPEC and PHC: settlement decision and judgment (plaintiff win), 2007-2012
All P SME P Large
Settle P Win Settle P Win Settle P Win
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Costs cap
IPEC 0.097 0.040 -0.320 0.430 0.500 -0.007
(0.253) (0.891) (0.414) (0.315) (0.412) (0.497)
Postreform -0.007 0.116 -1.362* 1.715* 0.274 -0.299
(0.266) (0.781) (0.703) (0.936) (0.345) (0.370)
IPEC×Postreform 0.130 -0.453 1.126* -1.567*** 0.306 -0.258
(0.225) (0.955) (0.631) (0.796) (0.346) (0.382)
Case characteristics
Case transferred -0.088 -0.122 -0.137 -0.171 0.020 -0.244
(0.152) (0.655) (0.220) (0.168) (0.303) (0.315)
ln case value 0.021 -0.032 -0.022 0.039 0.093 -0.150
(0.050) (0.189) (0.074) (0.050) (0.128) (0.152)
Infringement claim 0.127 -0.138 -0.277 0.333 0.255 0.084
(0.255) (0.982) (0.434) (0.354) (0.458) (0.500)
Invalidity claim 0.309 -0.294 -0.521 0.267 0.583 0.131
(0.241) (1.841) (0.453) (0.392) (0.413) (0.646)
Counterclaim 0.006 -0.253 0.194
(0.114) (0.192) (0.172)
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff individual 0.152 -0.315 0.195 -0.064 0.228 -0.270
(0.162) (0.947) (0.311) (0.220) (0.505) (0.491)
Defendant individual 0.455*** -0.787 0.541*** -0.105 0.379* -0.027
(0.128) (2.618) (0.188) (0.287) (0.228) (0.340)
Plaintiff Europe -0.059 0.074 -0.088 -0.566 0.025 -0.090
(0.157) (0.531) (0.649) (0.655) (0.186) (0.160)
Plaintiff World 0.038 -0.281 -0.314 0.524 0.163 -0.364*
(0.150) (0.501) (0.696) (0.824) (0.178) (0.193)
Defendant Europe 0.468** -0.842 0.358 0.559 0.508** -0.203
(0.187) (2.647) (0.471) (0.418) (0.233) (0.386)
Defendant World 0.484*** -1.111 -0.007 -0.592** 0.543** -0.404
(0.178) (2.730) (0.423) (0.293) (0.221) (0.430)
NPE -0.108 0.089 1.071 -1.153 -0.368 0.098
(0.235) (0.876) (0.912) (0.772) (0.269) (0.346)
Mills ratio -2.773 -0.660 -0.834
(0.730) (0.721) (1.067)
IP type FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time trend (by quarter) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number obs. 674 253 355
Number obs. settled 454 163 244
Notes: Heckman 2-step selection correction OLS regression. Dependent variable in 1st stage equal to one if case settled and in 2nd
stage if plaintiff wins. P SME: plaintiff is SME; P Large: plaintiff is large firm. All regressions include a constant. Time period is 2007-
2013; PHC data contain only patent cases; IPEC trademark cases include passing-off claims; IPEC design cases include registered and
unregistered design rights. Sample excludes cases brought by performance rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited).
IP type FE: dummy variable for each type of IP right (patent, trademark, copyright, registered design, database). Regressions include a
dummy variable equal to one if the case value is missing. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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